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I. INTRODUCTION 
At the beginning of the Environmental Decade of the 1970s, 
thoughtful students of the new field of environmental law observed 
an interesting phenomenon. While a homeowner could enjoin a neigh-
bor from harming his or her land and could recover damages for 
injury to it, public natural resources lacked a clear champion. The 
states possessed limited common law authority to protect public 
resources, and the federal government had to rely on explicit legis-
lative mandates before acting. In the absence of broad governmental 
power to recover damages for injury to public natural resources, a 
few critics even began to explore ways in which the resources them-
selves could be assigned private guardians. Against this background, 
in a little-noticed provision of the 1980 hazardous waste cleanup law 
widely known as the "Superfund," but titled the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response and Compensation Act (CERCLA), Con-
gress created the first federal and state resources trustees and em-
powered them to seek damages for injury caused by toxic wastes to 
public natural resources. 1 
1 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), as amended by Superfund Amendments and 
Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986). 
Section 101 of CERCLA defines these natural resources as "land, fish, wildlife, biota, air, 
water, ground water, drinking water supplies, and other such resources belonging to, managed 
by, held in trust by, appertaining to, or otherwise controlled by the United States ... , any 
State or local government, any foreign government, any Indian tribe, or ... member of an 
Indian tribe." 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (Supp. IV 1986). Other federal statutes authorizing recovery 
of damages to publicly controlled natural resources are narrower in scope. See, e.g., Outer 
Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendment of 1978,43 U.S.C. § 1813(a)(2)(CHD), (b)(3) (1982); 
Deepwater Port Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1517(i)(3) (1982); Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, 
43 U.S.C. § 1653(a)(1), (c)(1) (1982); Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1321(0(5) (1982). 
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The Superfund law is not perfect. Indeed, federal lawmaking 
sometimes suggests Chancellor Bismarck's admonition that one 
should not inquire how legislation and sausages are made. N ever-
theless, it appears to be adequate to the task of obtaining substantial 
recoveries to be spent on resource restoration and replacement, as 
long as the federal government fully implements the resource dam-
ages through statutorily-mandated guidelines. Already state and 
federal governments have obtained over $30 million in natural re-
source damages in settlements of Superfund cleanup cases.2 Further, 
the United States is seeking $1.8 billion from Shell Oil Company for 
damages at the Rocky Mountain Arsenal near Denvetl and has em-
broiled itself in controversy for offering to settle its $50 million claim 
for natural resource damages to New Bedford Harbor for a few 
million dollars. 4 
The Department of the Interior, however, has taken an overly 
conservative approach to implementing the natural resource damage 
provisions. One provision of the Department's guidelines in partic-
ular poses a major hurdle to optimal natural resource damage recov-
ery. The Department maintains that the common law limits the 
damages that trustees can sue to recover the lesser of either (1) lost 
resource use values or (2) restoration or replacement costs. This 
Article probes at length into the relationship between Superfund 
and the common law to show that Congress does not view traditional 
common law doctrines as a limitation on the scope of Superfund's 
remedial and compensatory provisions. 
What is at stake in the interpretation of the damage provisions is 
whether lost or damaged public natural resources will be replaced 
or restored so that the enjoyment of natural resources can continue 
substantially unimpaired. More than the loss of timber, waterfowl, 
or harvestable species of fish and shellfish is threatened. The loss of 
songbirds, natural vistas, endangered species habitat, and entire 
stable ecosystems is also involved. Surely the value oflost songbirds, 
for example, is not to be measured just by their caged value, or even 
by the willingness to pay for them measured by birdwatchers' pur-
2 This figure was generally agreed upon in discussions among officials of the Department of 
Interior, Solicitor's Office and Office of Policy Analysis, the New York Attorney General's 
Office, and attorneys for industry and public interest groups at the ABA symposium discussed 
supra note 1. 
3 United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064, 1084 (D. Colo. 1985). 
4 United States v. AVX Corp., C.A. No. 83-3882-Y (D. Mass.) (moving papers filed by the 
National Wildlife Federation in opposition to a proposed partial consent decree are on file 
with the author). 
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chases of field guides, binoculars, and transportation, as appears to 
be the case under current federal rules. The question for the trust-
ees, agencies, and the courts, then, is whether the Superfund will 
be used to help meet the cost of maintaining public natural resources 
at existing levels, not only for their approximate market values, but 
for their wider uses and their "existence"5 and "option"6 values as 
well. The way to ensure this result is greater restoration and re-
placement of natural resources, measured at the full cost of restoring 
the uses which the public has lost. 
This Article enters upon treacherous ground because it attempts 
to predict how governmental institutions will behave in implement-
ing an innovative statute. On the one hand, the courts may be 
tempted to agree with the Department of Interior's restrictive ap-
proach and to limit recovery for injury to natural resources by 
reading restrictive common law concepts governing liability, causa-
tion, and damage recovery into the statute. On the other hand, the 
Article concludes that the natural resource damage provisions are 
part and parcel of the Superfund and that the courts are likely to 
interpret them no less broadly than they have interpreted the rest 
of Superfund's provisions for which they already have been per-
suaded that Congress relaxed the requirements of the common law. 
The courts are likely to conclude that, in all parts of Superfund, 
including the natural resource damage provisions, Congress intended 
to go well beyond prior requirements of law, fashioning a powerful 
5 The existence or vicarious value "of a natural resource ... derives solely from an individ-
ual's knowledge that the resource exists. For example, an individual may derive satisfaction 
purely from the knowledge that Alaska's Denali National Park exists, even if he has never 
visited Denali and is sure that he will not do so in the future." Glossary of Terms, paper 
prepared for the Resources for the Future Conference (Washington, D.C. June 16-17, 1988) 
(on file with author). "Bequest and Existence Values are derived from knowledge that a 
resource is preserved, even though an individual may have no intent to ever personally use 
the resource. Existence value is often motivated by altruism. For example, citizens may wish 
to leave a pristine river to future generations (known as bequest value) or may wish to 
preserve fish and animal life in a natural condition and, as a result, be willing to pay to 
preserve or restore the service flows of the natural resource (known as existence value)." 
Schulze, Use of Direct Methods for Valuing Natural Resource Damages 1-2, paper prepared 
for the Resources for the Future Conference. The seminal paper is Krutilla, Conservation 
Reconsidered, 57 AM. ECON. REV. (pt. 2) 777 (1967). 
6 "Option Value is derived from individuals' desire to preserve the option of use of a natural 
resource, even if they are not currently using it. Thus, a fisherman who did not fish in a river 
this year may be willing to pay to clean up the river today to have the option of future use." 
Schulze, supra note 5, at 1; see also Weisbrod, Collective-Consumption Services of Individual-
Consumption Goods, 78 J. EcoN. 471 (1964) (stating that a number of significant commodities 
exist that may be of a pure individual-consumption variety, but also possess characteristics of 
a pure collective-consumption good). 
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corrective and compensatory mechanism based on a broad theory of 
cost-internalization. 7 
To effectuate this sweeping policy goal, Congress included in CER-
CLA relaxed liability, broad federal power to determine cleanup 
scope and financial responsibility, civil penalties, rebuttable pre-
sumptions, and summary administrative and judicial proceedings, 
which are legislative devices that Congress has frequently included 
in modern welfare legislation. The courts uphold and even extend 
such statutes, despite the anti-interventionist bias of the common 
law. 8 
II. SUPERFUND PROVISIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION: 1980-1988 
A. General and Natural Resource Damage Provisions 
The Superfund creates a cleanup program for abandoned and in-
active hazardous waste disposal sites and chemical spills. 9 It is an 
extension of both the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 
which created a strict regulatory regime for active hazardous waste 
disposal sites, and the liability and cleanup provisions of the Clean 
Water Act. 10 Federally-funded cleanups are the most visible portion 
of this site cleanup program. Such cleanups are responsible for the 
general public perception that the heart of Superfund is direct fed-
eral cleanup.11 Cleanups are subject to a plethora of statutory and 
7 Some members of Congress sought to deter future harmful conduct by imposing risk and 
cost sharing in Superfund, but it is clear that the primary purpose of the legislation was 
correcting hazardous situations at the expense of responsible parties. See generally Shavell, 
Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. OF LEGAL STUD. 357 (1984) (discussing 
merits of using liability and regulation to reduce risks). 
8 See G. CALABRES!, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 32-38 (1982). 
9 CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), as amended by SARA, Pub. 
L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986). 
10 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6901-699li 
(West 1983 & Supp. 1988); Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 1321(f), 33 U.S.C.A. 
§§ 1251-1376 (West 1983 & Supp. 1988) (popularly known as the Clean Water Act (CWA». 
II Under the 1980 legislation, revenues were to be collected over a five-year period ending 
in 1985, with the $1.38 billion collected from taxes on the manufacture of petroleum products 
and certain inorganic chemicals and $220 million from general federal revenues. CERCLA, 
42 U.S.C. § 9631(b)(I)(A), (2) (repealed 1987). Under the 1986 reauthorization, SARA enlarged 
the fund to $6.65 billion and extended its life through 1991. The fund is financed by taxes on 
oil and chemicals, LR.C. §§ 4611,4661,4671 (1986); an environmental tax on corporate income, 
LR.C. § 59A (1986); and by general appropriations of up to $250 million per year, SARA, 
Pub. L. No. 99-499, § 517(b), 100 Stat. 1613, 1773. The Superfund also receives cleanup costs 
and penalties recovered from responsible parties. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607. 
Congress was not willing to approve a Senate-proposed $2.5 billion victim compensation 
fund, which would have added federally fueled pressure to the 14 percent-plus inflation 
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administrative rules through the National Contingency Plan 
(NCP).12 A National Priority List (NPL) of sites has first call on the 
Superfund and other cleanup efforts. 13 
These reporting, inventorying, and Superfund-expenditure re-
quirements saddle the federal government with the obligation to see 
that sites are cleaned up. The statute also places ultimate financial 
responsibility on the concerns that used the sites and created the 
dangerous conditions. 14 The parties potentially responsible for site 
spill cleanup are generally the same as the parties responsible for 
paying natural resource damages. These parties include current and 
past owners and operators of vessels and facilities, waste generators 
or other persons who "arranged" for treatment, disposal, or trans-
port of waste, and transporters who selected a disposal or treatment . 
facility that required a Superfund response. 15 
Once the government specifies a remedy after a remedial inves-
tigation and feasibility study (RIfFS),16 the government itself may 
clean up a site and bring suit later to shift the costs to responsible 
parties. In the alternative, the government may seek to have the 
responsible parties carry out the cleanup that it has specified. Lia-
afflicting the nation's economy at the time. S. 1480, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 5(b), 126 CONGo 
REC. 30,901 (1980); see Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 
1, 21 (1982); Trauberman, Compensating Victims of Toxic Substance Pollution: An Analysis 
of Existing Federal Statutes, 5 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 1 (1981). Recovery for personal 
injuries was left to the common law, although hearings and debates prior to CERCLA's 
enactment focused on the compensation issue. S. 1480, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 4(a), (c), (n), 
126 CONGo REC. 30,901 (1980). Congress authorized a study commission to report on the 
adequacy of common law recovery for injury from hazardous substances. 42 U.S.C. § 9651(e). 
The commission's final report was published in 1982. See SUPERFUND SECTION 301(E) STUDY 
GROUP, 97TH CONG., 2D SESS., INJURIES AND DAMAGES FROM HAZARDOUS WASTES-ANAL-
YSIS AND IMPROVEMENT OF LEGAL REMEDIES [hereinafter SUPERFUND STUDY GROUP], pt. 
1 (Comm. Print 1982). The author was a member of the Study Group. 
1242 U.S.C. § 9605 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). EPA Superfund, Emergency Planning, and 
Community Right-to-Know Programs, 40 C.F.R. § 300 (1987). 
13 42 U.S.C. § 9605(8) (Supp. IV 1986). 
1442 U.S.C. §§ 9604(a)(I), 9606(a). 
15 [d. § 9607(a)(1)-(4). Site users incur no liability if the release is caused solely by acts of 
God, acts of war, acts or omissions of certain third parties, or some combination of these. [d. 
§ 9607(b). The Act also establishes liability limitations that apply unless the actual or threat-
ened release was the result of willful misconduct. [d. § 9607(c). The Fund can also sue insurers 
and other guarantors directly for amounts already expended. [d. § 9612(c)(3). The statute 
prevents the transfer of liability by conveyance or by indemnification, hold harmless, and 
similar agreements, although this does not bar agreements to insure or indemnify in order to 
meet the costs of liability. [d. § 9607(e). 
16 [d. §§ 9604(a), 9606 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
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bility extends to costs incurred by federal or state governments or 
by other persons. 17 Parties are financially responsible even though 
they may have already paid substantial sums into the Superfund 
through the taxes that Superfund imposes. Still, Congress clearly 
wants EPA to negotiate voluntary cleanups with private parties 
before expending Superfund revenues. 18 
Personal injuries are not recompensable, but restoration, replace-
ment, and damages to natural resources are. 19 The Superfund com-
prehensively covers "land, fish, wildlife, biota, air, water, ground 
water, drinking water supplies and other such resources" owned, 
managed, held in trust, or otherwise controlled by the United States, 
a state, a local government, or an Indian tribe. 20 Liability includes 
"damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, 
including the reasonable cost of assessing such injury, destruction, 
or loss" resulting from the release of a hazardous substance.21 
Because resources themselves do not have standing to sue,22 Con-
gress invented the resources guardian or trustee. 23 Liability is to 
the federal government or to the states as trustees of the affected 
natural resources. Most important, to ease the trustees' difficult 
task, any determination of damages made by the trustee in accor-
dance with natural resource damage regulations promulgated under 
the Act has the force of a rebuttable presumption in any judicial or 
administrative proceeding for recovery. 24 
Obviously, the natural resource damage regulations-an important 
innovation that breaks new ground by having agencies and courts 
share the responsibility for establishing cause and harm-are of 
paramount importance. 25 The regulations specify standard proce-
17Id. § 9607(a)(A), (B) (Supp. IV 1986). 
18 Pub. L. No. 99-499, § 122(a), 100 Stat. 1678 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 9622(a)-
(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1986». 
19 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(C) (Supp. IV 1986). 
2°Id. § 9601(16). 
21Id. § 9607(a)(C). Section 30l(C) of CERCLA required the President to promulgate reg-
ulations for the assessment of natural resource damages by December 11, 1982. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 965l(c)(1) (Supp. IV 1986). SARA extended this deadline to April 17, 1987. 42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 9651(c)(1) (West Supp. 1988). 
22 See generally C. STONE, SHOULD TREES HAVE STANDING? (1974); C. STONE, EARTH 
AND OTHER ETHICS (1987). 
23 42 U.S.C. § 9607(0(1) to (2)(B) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
24 Id. at § 9607(0(2)(C). The regulations also identify the best procedures for determining 
direct and indirect injuries, taking into consideration such factors as replacement value, use 
value, and the ability of the ecosystem or resource to recover. 42 U.S.C. § 965l(c)(2) (1982). 
25 42 U.S.C. § 9651(c)(2). For convenience, citations to all the relevant rule makings for the 
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dures for simplified assessments r:equiring minimal field observation, 
called "type A" assessments. These assessments typically will be 
done with a simple computer model. "Type B" assessments address 
larger impacts case-by-case and require a significant amount of field 
work. 
The only avenue to recovery of natural resource damages is 
through private responsible parties, although CERCLA allowed 
claims against the federal Superfund prior to the 1986 amendments. 26 
Damages for resource injuries caused before CERCLA was enacted 
theoretically are not available, but, since 1986, the statute includes 
the "discovery rule." The states have adopted this rule in increasing 
numbers in recent years as their statute of limitations on toxic 
personal injury claims. The discovery rule enables a party to file a 
claim for harm that is "discovered" long after exposure to a disease 
agent, for example, when cancer appears after a long latency period. 
Thus, actions for natural resource damages must be filed within three 
years of the later of the date of discovery of the loss and its connec-
tion to the release, or the date on which the regulations were pro-
mulgated. 27 At sites or facilities where remedial action is pending, 
an action for damages must be commenced within three years after 
completion of the remedial action. 28 
natural resource damages provisions and the type A and type B assessments are set out here: 
A. Final Type B Rules: 51 Fed. Reg. 27,674 (1986) (codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 11 (1986)); 
B. Final Type A Rules: 52 Fed. Reg. 9,042 (1987) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 11); 
C. Adjustments for the SARA Amendments: 53 Fed. Reg. 5,166 (1988) (to be codified at 
43 C.F.R. pt. 11); 
D. Type A Corrections: 53 Fed. Reg. 9,769 (1988) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 11); 
E. Type B Advance Notice of Proposed Rule Making: 53 Fed. Reg. 15,714 (1988) (proposed 
May 3, 1988); and 
F. Type A Advance Notice of Proposed Rule Making: 53 Fed. Reg. 20,143 (1988) (proposed 
June 2, 1988). 
26 CERCLA § 9611 still provides for natural resource claims against the Superfund so long 
as all administrative and judicial remedies to recover from the liable parties have been 
exhausted. 42 U.S.C. § 9611(b)(2)(A) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Covered costs include the cost 
of assessing the injuries to natural resources from a release and compensation for the costs 
of restoring or replacing the resources. I d. § 9611(c)(1)-(2). No Superfund money may be used 
for the natural resources if the President determines that all of the Fund is needed for 
response to health threats. ld. § 9611(e)(2). Provisions of § 9611, however, have been rendered 
temporarily inapplicable by SARA § 517(a), which amended the Internal Revenue Code of 
1986 to exclude Superfund expenditures for natural resource purposes under § 9611. 26 U.S.C. 
§ 9507(c)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 1986). 
2742 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(1) (Supp. IV 1986). See final type A and B regulations, supra note 
25. 
28 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(1). The trustee must give the President and any potentially respon-
sible party sixty days notice before filing suit. Also, a trustee may not commence action for 
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B. The Trusteeship of Natural Resources 
The concept of state or federal government acting as a trustee is 
not new. The concept functions like trust arrangements made by 
either legislatures by special enactment or by the courts on an ad 
hoc basis after a hearing, for example, for the senile or for unborn 
children in contested wills. The California legislature has even given 
public-interest organizations standing to sue to protect works of fine 
art.29 
To counteract environmental disruption, the states have brought 
suits parens patriae or under the public trust doctrine of the common 
law to protect natural resources, as well as under certain public trust 
statutes. 30 Courts have steadily expanded the public trust concept 
beyond application to submerged lands, the foreshore, and navigable 
waters to encompass injuries to parks, non-navigable water, air, 
land, wetlands, ecological values, and water quantity as well as 
quality. 31 The doctrine retains vigor, as evinced by the Supreme 
Court's decision last year in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi,32 
but has roots in early nineteenth century state law. 33 Yet the law 
has still not settled whether a state suit parens patriae will support 
an action for damages as well as injunctive relief. 34 Perhaps for this 
reason, about sixty percent of the states have authorized actions for 
money damages for injury to fish and wildlife. 35 
The federal government exercises broad trust-like authority under 
organic legislation for parks, forests, and public lands. The only close 
damages before selection of the remedial action if the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
is diligently proceeding with the remedial investigation and feasibility study. See 132 CONGo 
REC. S14,930 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986) (colloquy of Sen. Baucus with Sen. Stafford) (emphasizing 
fiduciary responsibilities trustees owe to public); 132 CONGo REC. H9612 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 
1986) (statement of Rep. Jones of North Carolina) (emphasizing importance that trustee 
observe his fiduciary duties in natural resource damage cases). 
29 CAL. CIVIL CODE § 989(C) (West Supp. 1988). 
30 See Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effective Judicial Inter-
vention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970); Note, State Protection of its Economy and Environ-
ment: Parens Patriae Suits for Damages, 6 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 411 (1970). 
31 See Carlson, Making CERCLA Natural Resource Damage Regulations Work: The Use 
of the Public Trust Doctrine and Other State Remedies, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 
10,299, 10,302 (1988). 
32 108 S. Ct. 791, reh'g denied, 108 S. Ct. 1760 (1988). 
33 See Comment, Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi: Is the Public Trust Becoming 
Synonymous with the Public Interest?, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,200, 10,201 
(1988). 
34 Halter & Thomas, Recovery of Damages for Fish and Wildlife Losses Caused by Pollu-
tion, 10 ECOLOGY L.Q. 5, 10 (1982). 
a5Id. at 9. 
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federal analogy to state trust concepts, however, is the federal legal 
trusteeship of Indian tribes and lands. 36 Hence, no federal trust 
doctrine goes as far as the Superfund in making money damages 
available when public natural resources are injured. Because the 
concept of a trustee of natural resources is specifically legislated by 
Superfund,37 with the broad implied fiduciary obligations that accom-
pany the trust relationship as it exists throughout Anglo-American 
law, one may ask whether the trustee owes obligations toward nat-
ural resources-the "corpus" of the trust-that are not spelled out 
in Superfund. Like bank officials who are liable to beneficiaries for 
their mishandling of trust funds, a natural resource trustee's failure 
to perform fiduciary duties toward resources may be actionable at 
the instance of private citizens, the beneficiaries of the trust. Ar-
guably, section 310 of Superfund (the citizen's suit provision) affords 
a basis for such action. 38 
In the broadest sense, of course, government officials are "trust-
ees" of resources that they are charged by statute to administer in 
the public interest. No special fiduciary duties attach to this routine 
administration of public natural resources, although a leading com-
mentator on the evolution of environmental law has observed that, 
on the state level, the public trust doctrine may function procedurally 
like the state version of the federal judicial "hard look" doctrine. 39 
Routine judicial review of administrative action aside, any cause of 
action against the federal government for alleged failure to admin-
ister public resources properly must be explicitly granted by statute. 
But the Superfund is different: it specifically mentions the "trustee," 
sets up an appointment process, gives the trustee certain duties, 
and empowers the trustee to bring legal actions to protect the trust 
corpus. The trustee is not an ordinary government official; a trust 
is not a routine resources management tool. 
36 C. WILKINSON, INDIAN TRIBES AS SOVEREIGN GOVERNMENTS ch. 2 (1988); see also C. 
WILKINSON, OF AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW: HISTORICAL RIGHTS AT THE BAR 
OF THE SUPREME COURT (1986). 
37 42 U.S.C.A. § 9611(b) (West 1983 & Supp. 1988). 
38 CERCLA § 310, 42 U.S.C.A. § 9659 (West Supp. 1988). 
39 1 W. ROGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 2.20, at 162-64 (1986). Rogers further notes, 
however, a difference between "hard look" procedural review and application of the public 
trust doctrine: the public trust doctrine is designed to protect the public "from reallocations 
favoring narrow constituencies." Id. at 164. Allowing private parties to injure public natural 
resources in return for payment of damages for lost public use values erodes the public trust 
concept of impeding the flow of resources away from the public domain. Restoration or 
replacement is more appropriate under the public trust concept of natural resources. 
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C. Program Implementation 
1. Implementation of the Site Cleanup and Natural Resource 
Damage Programs 
415 
The Superfund program has worked well for quick emergency 
containment of spills and fires, and has stimulated negotiated clean-
ups at the older, more stable sites. Yet, to date, only twenty-nine 
sites have been cleaned up from the NPL of 951 sites. 40 The govern-
ment's own estimate of future cleanups sets the "half-life" of site 
cleanup past the millennium (twenty-five to thirty sites a year), with 
the current list to be completed around the year 2020 at a total cost 
of tens of billions of dollars.41 Federal studies indicate that many 
more sites may eventually be placed on the NPL,42 with the result 
that cleanups may stretch sixty years into the future. 
Amendments to Superfund in 1986 were redolent of the tinkering 
and "mid-course corrections" that Congress made in other major 
environmental statutes in the last decade. The Superfund amend-
ments failed to address major ambiguities in the liability provisions 
of the statute, denied funding adequate to correct the abandoned 
waste site problem, and did not effectively alter the schedule for 
cleanup. Further, many believe that the injection of regulatory stan-
dards from other environmental statutes directly into the veins of 
the struggling remedial program may prove to be a coagulant fatal 
to Superfund in the next few years.43 By defining how "clean" a 
cleanup must be by applying regulatory standards from other envi-
ronmental statutes-standards that arguably should be used only 
for entire categories of point sources of industrial pollution-Con-
gress may have denied EPA flexibility vital to tailoring remedies 
case-by-case to address the tremendous variety of Superfund sites. 44 
40 Mobilizing the Private Sector, Before the Subcomm. On Superfund and Envtl. Oversight 
of the Senate Comm. on Env't and Pub. Works 3 (Dec. 10, 1987) (statement of James W. 
Moorman, of Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft) [hereinafter Moorman] (referring to presen-
tation made by J. Winston Porter, EPA Assistant Administrator for Solid Waste and Emer-
gency Response, participating at a Conference on Superfund, at Airlie House, in Warrenton, 
Va. (Oct. 20, 1987)) (on file with author). See also 52 Fed. Reg. 27,621 (1987) (802 sites listed 
on the NPL; 149 proposed for listing). 
41 Moorman, supra note 40, at 3-4 (referring to presentation made by J. Winston Porter). 
42 U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EXTENT OF NATION'S POTENTIAL HAZARDOUS 
WASTE PROBLEM STILL UNKNOWN (GAO/RCED-88-44) (Dec. 1987). 
43 SARA § 121(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9621(d)(2) (West Supp. 1988). 
44 Moorman, supra note 40 (discussing how the Applicable or Relevant and Appropriate 
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The natural resource damage recovery and remedial programs 
have moved forward slowly, but for different reasons in each case. 
While EPA has poured enormous effort into the remedial program, 
and has obtained favorable judicial precedents for its broad inter-
pretation of strict and joint and several liability, causation, and 
defenses, the DepartmElnt of Interior has given the natural resource 
damage provisions little attention. 45 The remedial program thus has 
too many chefs in the kitchen, while the natural resource damage 
provisions have too few. 
The Department of Interior did not draft the rules governing 
natural resource damage assessments until after the two-year sta-
tutory deadline for their promulgation had expired,46 and did not 
finish the rules until 1987, four years after the deadline period.47 As 
has frequently happened with guidelines under other environmental 
statutes, states and environmental groups had to sue to force pro-
duction of these rules. 48 Similarly, environmental groups and ten 
states have challenged the final rules, alleging that they provide 
inadequate compensation. 49 Some members of Congress attacked the 
Department's performance and tried to change it in the 1986 amend-
ments. 50 A suit to recover natural resource damages from the federal 
Superfund resulted in a federal circuit court decision rejecting as 
dilatory the administration's "pre authorization" scheme for process-
ing several billion dollars in natural resource damage claims filed by 
state trustees. 51 
Regulatory Standards (ARARS) process has caused extensive delays, confusion, and cost 
overruns). 
45 U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGE CLAIMS AND As-
SESSMENT REGULATIONS UNDER SUPERFUND 4 (GAO/RCED-84-196) (1984). 
46 42 U.S.C.A. § 9651(c) (West Supp. 1988). 
47 Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 53 Fed. Reg. 5166 (1988) (amending 43 C.F.R. 
pt. 11 (1987». 
48 Consent order on rule promulgation, New Jersey v. Ruckelshaus, No. 84-1668 (D. N.J. 
Feb. 5, 1985). 
49 E.g., National Wildlife Fed'n v. United States Dep't of the Interior, No. 86-1575 (D.C. 
Cir. filed Nov. 24, 1986). 
50 See 132 CONGo REC. S14,930 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986) (colloquy between Sen. Stafford and 
Sen. Baucus); accord, 132 CONGo REC. H9612-13 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1986) (statement of Rep. 
Jones of North Carolina); see also Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 52 Fed. Reg. 
12,886 (proposed Apr. 17, 1987) (proposing changes in rules due to SARA's reversal of certain 
provisions). See the final rules issued Feb. 22, 1988, 53 Fed. Reg. 5166 (1988). 
51 New Jersey V. Ruckelshaus, No. 84-1668 (D.N.J. Dec. 12, 1984), aff'd, No. 85-5135 (3d 
Cir. Jan. 24, 1986). 
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2. Integration and Coordination of Remedies, Removals, and 
Natural Resource Damage Recovery 
417 
The text of Superfund leaves many key problems unresolved, as 
is usual with complex legislation that delegates implementation to 
an administrative agency. Rulemaking to address these unanswered 
questions is partially provided in the EPA's NCP and by the EPA's 
NPL of sites. The Department of Interior also produced the natural 
resource guidelines by notice-and-comment rulemaking. 
The process of EPA elaboration of Superfund's meaning has not 
ended, however, with notice-and-comment rulemaking. EPA has 
prepared hundreds of pages of informal Guidance Memoranda that 
spell out EPA's program plans and expectations in exhaustive detail. 
It taxes the abilities of Superfund lawyers to keep track of what 
guidance EPA has proposed, finalized, withdrawn, and awarded in 
this gray world of agency policy-making. 5~ Whether these materials 
are "law" is a less settled question. 
The N CP, the Department of Interior's guidelines, and EPA Guid-
ance Memoranda govern the relationship of the natural resource 
damages program to the dominant removal and remedial programs. 
EPA and the Department's implementation policy for the natural 
resource damage provisions of Superfund seems to be comprehensive 
at first. 53 Federal action under the removal and remedial programs 
and actions under the natural resource damage program begin more 
or less together, but then they gradually diverge. First, EPA must 
notify trustees if a potential natural resource injury exists. 54 (Like-
52 See Anderson, Negotiation and Informal Agency Action: The Case of Superfund, 1985 
DUKE L.J. 261, 287-97 [hereinafter Anderson, Negotiationl. 
53 53 Fed. Reg. 5166 (1988) (amending 43 C.F.R. pt. 11 (1987)). 
54 See 42 U.S.C. § 9604(b)(2); 40 C.F.R. § 300.52(d) (1988). A discharge of spill requires a 
different approach than a more leisurely, remedial action. An "On-Scene Coordinator/Remedial 
Project Manager" (OSC/RPM) collects facts about the discharge or release, including "the 
potential impact on natural resources and property which may be affected." 40 C.F.R. 
§ 300.33(b)(2). If natural resources have been affected, the OSC/RPM promptly notifies the 
affected land managing agency and trustee of the release or discharge. Id. § 300.33(b)(9); see 
also 43 C.F.R. § 11.20(a) (1986). The "OSC or RPM should consult with and coordinate all 
response activities with the affected land managing agency or resource trustee to the extent 
possible." 40 C.F.R. § 300.33(b)(9). Field sampling and data collection by the trustee should 
be coordinated with the lead agency under the NCP to avoid duplication. 43 C.F.R. § 11.22(b) 
(1986). 
The OSC/RPM's report following a major discharge of oil or a release of a hazardous 
substance, pollutant, or contaminant is to include "[clomments on whether the discharge or 
release might have or actually did affect natural resources," 40 C.F.R. § 300.40(c)(1)(vii), and 
"[clomments on Federal or State damage assessment activities and efforts to replace or restore 
damaged natural resources." Id. § 300.40(c)(1)(viii). 
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wise, if the trustee learns of the potential injury first, the trustee 
must notify EPA.)55 In a remedial situation, based largely on data 
in the RIIFS, the trustee conducts a "pre-assessment screening" to 
see if a full assessment is necessary. 56 The trustee must verify that 
ordinary response actions will not remedy the natural resource in-
jury adequately. 57 If a full assessment is necessary, the trustee must 
prepare an assessment plan covering assessment costs and scientific 
and economic methodologies. 58 The potentially responsible parties 
have to be invited to help define and participate in the assessment. 59 
The trustee is supposed to coordinate assessment preparation with 
the lead agency under the NCP.60 
In the assessment plan, the trustee must establish that injury in 
fact did occur and that the responsible party's discharges or releases 
caused the injury.61 The standards for discharge, release, and cau-
sation appear to parallel the generous standards of the removal and 
remedial programs, as they should. 62 In quantifying the damage, the 
trustee must determine the decrease in the "level of services" which 
the resource provides by comparing the service level before injury 
to that which will exist after the response is completed. 63 Finally, 
the trustee must seek either cost of restoration or replacement or 
diminution of use values, whichever is less. 64 The Department of 
If the aSC/RPM's preliminary assessment of a release indicates that natural resources have 
been or are likely to be damaged, the trustee is to be notified so that the trustee may initiate 
appropriate action under 40 C.F.R. § 300. 74(b). These potential actions include requesting 
the lead agency to seek judicial or administrative action under CERCLA § 106 to abate 
imminent hazards to the public health, welfare, or environment; requesting the lead agency 
to remove the hazardous substance or to provide for remedial action under CERCLA § 104; 
and initiating action against the responsible parties under CERCLA § 107(a). 40 C.F.R. 
§ 300.74(b)(1)-(3). The trustee's main responsibilities, however, are to assess damages in 
accordance with CERCLA § 301(c), to seek recovery of the damages and assessment costs 
from the responsible parties, and to devise and carry out a plan for the restoration, rehabili-
tation, or replacement of the natural resource. Id. § 300. 74(a). 
55 43 C.F.R. § 11.20(b) (1986). 
56 Id. § 11.23(a). This two-step process is strongly reminiscent of the threshold determina-
tion of whether a proposed federal action will have a significant enough impact on the envi-
ronment to require an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) under the National Environ-
mental Policy Act (NEPA), and is just as likely to cause controversy in the future. See 
generally D. MANDELKER, NEPA LAW AND LITIGATION § 8:46 (1984). 
57 43 C.F.R. § 11.23(e)(5). 
56 Id. § 11.31(a)(1), (2). 
59Id. § 11.31(a)(4). 
60 Id. § 11.23(0. 
61Id. § 11.61(a). 
62 See infra note 134 and accompanying text. 
63 43 C.F.R. § 11.72. 
64 Id. § 11.35(b)(2). 
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Interior's regulations make clear that only injury to "public," not 
"private," interests are recoverable,65 that damages are compensa-
tory not punitive,66 and that any recovery is only for harm beyond 
that remedied in a Superfund response action. 67 
Two observations are appropriate here about the administrative 
implementation of the natural resource damage provisions. First, 
damage to natural resources alone will not cause EPA to place a site 
65 Id. § 11.35(b)(2). 
66 See id. § 11.80(b). 
67 See id. § 11.70. Notice that the various procedures mentioned here do not capitalize upon 
two important opportunities. First, they do not require the RIIFS process and the record of 
decision (ROD) to become the primary vehicle for pursuing natural resource cleanup and 
damage recovery in remedial situations. A separate natural resource damage process gradually 
diverges, albeit with coordination. Placing primary emphasis on the basic RIIFS-ROD process 
might strengthen the natural resource damage program, although some site cleanups may be 
slowed further by the slowness with which federal trustees may discharge their responsibili-
ties. 
EPA's internal directives on the RIIFS and ROD processes only briefly mention the natural 
resource damage assessment process. See GUIDANCE ON REMEDIAL INVESTIGATION UNDER 
CERCLA, EPA OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE (OSWER), (OSWER 
Directive No. 9355.0-06B June 1, 1985) (§ 6.7.2 calls for coordination with the Department of 
Interior's Office of Environmental Project Review when natural resources are affected); EPA 
OSWER, GUIDANCE ON FEASIBILITY STUDIES UNDER CERCLA (OSWER Directive No. 
9355.0-05C June 1, 1985) (§ 4.5.7 calls for consultation with the Bureau of Land Management, 
the Forest Service, and the Fish and Wildlife Service as potential sources of useful advice). 
The directive on preparation of decision documents dictates that the involvement of other 
federal agencies in the RIIFS process is "appropriate." EPA memorandum by Jack W. Mc-
Graw, Acting Assistant Administrator, Preparation of Decision Documents for Approving 
Fund-Financed and Potentially Responsible Party Remedial Actions Under CERCLA at 3 
(OSWER Directive No. 9340.2-01 Feb. 27, 1985). The directive does not call for such partic-
ipation in the final ROD or enforcement decision. Id. at 4. It is interesting that the Depart-
ments of Interior and Agriculture, the nation's largest public land managers, are not included 
in the short list of examples of agencies to be consulted. Id. at 3. A more recent directive 
calls for notice to the trustee as required by CERCLA § 122(j) and promises that "additional 
guidance on coordination with Federal Trustees will be developed." EPA OSWER, IMPLE-
MENTATION STRATEGY FOR REAUTHORIZED SUPERFUND: SHORT TERM PRIORITIES FOR Ac-
TION, (OSWER Directive No. 9200.3-02 Oct. 24, 1986). The additional guidance is not yet 
developed. 
Second, the procedures required by the Department of Interior's regulations do not make 
provision for natural resource damage administrative orders. Federal policy might formalize 
through Guidance Memoranda the federal trustee's request that restoration be carried out or 
damages be paid. The guidance provision for an administrative hearing might achieve two 
objectives that would strengthen the trustee's hand: (1) treble damages for refusal to comply 
with an administrative order if suit must be brought to compel compliance; and (2) use of the 
rebuttable presumption in an administrative proceeding, as the statute requires. The De-
partment of Interior takes the view that the statutory provision for use of the rebuttable 
presumption in administrative proceedings applies only to claims against the Fund. 
Thus, the author cannot agree with Habicht's positive endorsement of the federal admin-
istrative guidance. See Habicht, The Expanding Role of Natural Resources Damages Claims 
Under Superfund, 7 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 1, 17-18 (1987). 
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on the NPL. Health risk is at the core of NPL status. NPL status 
is, however, necessary for top priority federal attention. The Super-
fund does not require a site to be on the NPL for natural resource 
trustees to seek damages, but trustees will face tremendous obsta-
cles if their target sites are not on the list. Indeed, there has been 
litigation over the ability of responsible parties to recover costs from 
others when the expenditures were incurred prior to NPL status or 
were arguably incurred in a fashion inconsistent with the NCP.68 
Second, because a natural resource damage assessment may be 
"tacked on" to cleanup plans at priority NPL sites, they may not 
receive adequate attention. According to lawyers for responsible 
parties, EPA has had difficulty getting the trustees to formulate 
damage assessments in a timely manner. Personnel for resource 
damage assessments is limited. The Superfund cannot be used to 
pay for natural resource damage assessments after the 1986 Amend-
ments. 69 Where RIIFS costs may approach $1 million, only a few 
thousand may be available for determining natural resource dam-
ages. Finally, observers report that, in some instances, resource 
damage claims appear to have become an expendable chip in bar-
gaining over cleanup settlements. Consequently, natural resource 
damage evaluations may be incomplete, recoveries may be less than 
desirable, and remediation may be delayed. 
A possible conclusion is that the remedial and natural resource 
damage programs should proceed separately from each other. This 
view contradicts the current approach of close administrative coor-
dination. To an extent, it also contradicts both logic and intuition, 
but administrative realities may in fact confound both from time to 
time. 
III. SUPERFUND WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF FEDERAL REMEDIAL 
AND COMPENSATORY LEGISLATION 
Congress has not been as eager to enact remedial and compensa-
tory environmental measures as it has preventive environmental 
regulatory statutes. Still, Superfund is part of a federal paradigm 
for remedial and compensatory legislation that has been gradually 
68 Artesian Water Co. v. New Castle County, 659 F. Supp. 1269, 1277-79 (D. Del. 1987) 
(holding that in order for party to recover response costs, response action must be consistent 
with NCP); Pinole Point Properties, Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 596 F. Supp. 283, 289-90 
(N.D. Cal. 1984) (stating that consistency with NCP, not appearance on NPL, is all that is 
required for recovery of response costs). 
69 42 U.S.C. § 9611(b)(2)(B) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
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emerging for a number of years. If the agencies and courts interpret 
and implement the natural resource damage provisions of Superfund 
consistently with this basic paradigm, recoveries will be easier to 
obtain and will span a variety of types of injury. This result is 
possible because the paradigm assumes the relaxation of standards 
of liability, proof, and procedure that otherwise would apply under 
the common law and traditional norms of the judicial process. 
A. The Recent Emergence of Federal Remedial and 
Compensatory Legislation 
Historically, all environmental law was common law. At common 
law, if substantial problems of proof and legal action could be over-
come, courts would award money damages to compensate a private 
person for "environmental" harm or would prevent potential injury 
by awarding a prohibitive injunction. By the twentieth century, as 
part of a wider movement promoting legislative solutions to social 
problems, federal and state governments had put in place a few 
rudimentary statutes to prevent environmental harm. The common 
law had proved too narrow to deal comprehensively with the com-
munity:wide disruptions typical of environmental degradation. 70 
These early statutes addressed future harms and redressed public 
rather than private wrongs. By the 1970s, Congress and state leg-
islatures had enacted sweeping precautionary and environmental 
protection measures. The common law has been reduced to providing 
interim relief, pending likely regulation. 
70 Most commentators agree that the common law is a seriously flawed system for providing 
general environmental redress. A minority think that there are distinct advantages in having 
common law judges decide environmental cases. See FUlTow, Governing Science: Public Risks 
and Private Remedies, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1403, 1456-64 (1983). 
The movement from common law to statute that has taken place over recent decades 
throughout the American legal system has implications far beyond the confines of environ-
mental law. See G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 95 (1977). As one noted judge 
wrote, "The hydra headed problem is how to synchronize the unguided missiles launched by 
legislatures with a going system of common law." Traynor, Statutes Revolving in Common-
Lav) Orbits, 17 CATH. U.L. REV. 401, 402 (1968). Yet the possibilities for a fruitful, creative 
tension between common law and statute have been noted and encouraged by several out-
standing scholars of our jurisprudence. See, e.g., Friendly, The Gap in Lawmaking-Judges 
Who Can't and Legislatures Who Won't, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 787 (1963); Landis, Statutes and 
the Sources of Law, in HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS 213 (1934); Pound, Common Law and 
Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383 (1908); Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 
HARV. L. REV. 4 (1936). Searching for a role for courts in a statute-dominated era, Dean 
Calabresi has explored whether courts should take it upon themselves to invalidate outmoded 
statutes that no longer fit within the wider fabric of American law. See G. CALABRESI, A 
COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 163-66 (1982). 
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The statutory displacement of the damages remedy has occurred 
at a much slower pace than displacement of the preventive injunc-
tion. Legislatures have been slow to provide remedial funds or com-
pensation to wronged parties, whether from the public treasury or 
through a government-supervised transfer of funds from the persons 
responsible for harm. The main reason for this slower pace is the 
reluctance of legislatures to supplant the fault and cause-based civil 
law system. Despite this reluctance, legislatures have become more 
willing to act where harm is broadly diffused and its causes equally 
widespread and uncertain. In fact, in recent years, legislatures have 
deliberately relaxed the strict common law requirements for fault 
and causation in order to fashion broad redistributive corrective and 
compensatory programs that supplant the common law tort compen-
sation system. 71 
Congress has acted frequently enough in recent years to establish 
a general paradigm or template for federal ameliorative, restorative, 
and compensatory legislation. Superfund is not the first statute to 
fit the emerging template, nor is it the first to provide funds for 
repair and compensation for natural resource damage. 72 Although 
71 See, e.g., Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-945 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); Surface 
Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
72 For those who believe Superfund to be unprecedented, a look at these statutes is instruc-
tive. Indeed, §§ 104(a) and 106 are taken virtually verbatim from earlier legislation. Anderson, 
Negotiation, supra note 52, at 277. Superfund's funding mechanism is not unique; the pattern 
for this provision was established years earlier in the oil spill liability and abandoned mine 
reclamation acts. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(c)(2), (e) (1982) (oil spill liability); 30 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1232 
(1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (mine reclamation). Another of CERCLA's features, suits against 
responsible parties to recoup response costs when the conduct giving rise to the liability 
occurred before enactment of the law, is also found in Asbestos School Hazard Detection and 
Control Act of 1980, 20 U.S.C. § 3607 (1982). 
Superfund may appear to be a potpourri of elements invented or borrowed from other 
models in the corpus of federal legislation. It appears to draw upon all the basic legislative 
strategies used by Congress thus far to legislate environmental problems. One hardly needs 
to be reminded that Congress has relied primarily upon command-and-control regulation in 
controlling pollution. In Superfund, Congress did not require the EPA to set ambient or 
performance standards specifying the degree or type of cleanup required at the sites. The 
1980 Superfund legislation only called for quasi-legislative rulemaking in the National Contin-
gency Plan; agency policy in fact was set out in informal guidance memoranda that were not 
regulatory in nature. Anderson, Negotiation, supra note 52, at 287-92. In 1986 at the EPA's 
request, however, Congress specified that site remedies must meet all "legally applicable . . . 
[or] relevant and appropriate" standards required by the other environmental regulatory 
statutes. 42 U.S.C. § 9621(d)(2)(A) (Supp. IV 1986). This brief language makes Superfund 
much more like the Clean Water Act and the Clean Air Act, although this onerous requirement 
flies in the face of the need for individually tailored cleanup at most sites. See, e.g., Brown, 
The Settlement Dilemma (A Tragedy in Two Acts), 5 HAZ. WASTE REP. 12 (Dec. 12, 1983); 
Rogers, Three Years of Superfund, 13 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,362 (1983); Super-
fund-How to Rebuild a Badly Damaged Program?, 2 ENVTL. F. 17 (June 1983) (panel 
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Congress did not spell out its approach clearly, the federal courts, 
spurred by EPA and Justice Department arguments that the statute 
had to be given the broadest possible reading, have completed the 
discussion). Conversion of Superfund to a quasi-regulatory statute, more like the Clean Water 
and Clean Air Acts was perhaps inevitable, because the EPA is quintessentially a regulatory 
agency. Its basic mission and raison d'etre is regulation. (If one uses a hammer often, then 
everything begins to look like a nail.). 
Other hallmarks of federal environmental regulation are (1) shared responsibility with the 
states and (2) action-forcing deadlines. In Superfund, Congress delegated limited authority to 
obligate federal funds, to participate financially (generally 10%), and to settle claims. Yet 
Congress dropped all pretense of sharing basic responsibility with the states by refusing to 
delegate to them the implementation of federal standards. The usual action-forcing deadlines 
were conspicuously absent from Superfund in 1980, but as agency estimates of the time needed 
to complete the task reached into the next century, Congress disciplined the EPA (not the 
states) in 1986 by putting the EPA on a schedule of quotas for cleanup. 
Superfund is also a multi-billion dollar public works program and in this respect suggests 
the Clean Water Act approach, which combines industrial point-source category regulation 
with massive funding for municipal sewage treatment plants. CWA, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1281-1328 
(1982). The Clean Water Act also attempts to internalize costs to industrial discharges to 
publicly owned treatment works but leaves the municipalities to shoulder most operational 
costs. Still, the Clean Water Act provides for future water purification only, passes the funds 
to the states, does not authorize direct federal construction projects, and does not recover 
full costs for the broad array of water polluters. Id. 
Parallels to federal spill and disaster legislation over the years are much closer, although it 
is striking how little attention these resemblances have received from courts, legislators, and 
policy analysts. New Deal programs like the Civilian Conservation Corps and the Tennessee 
Valley Authority foreshadowed Superfund. Congress also adopted a number of Superfund-
like federal relief acts over the years to permit the federal government to assist state and 
local governments in responding to disasters. In the last fifteen years federal programs 
specifically designed to attack hazardous conditions that cannot be ameliorated except by 
direct clean-up action have proliferated. The text addresses the closest parallels. 
Environmental legislation is rarely "self-executing," that is, rarely does a federal environ-
mental law state a broad environmental protection standard and entrust its interpretation 
and enforcement to the courts as do, for example, the Michigan Environmental Protection 
Act (Anderson-Rockwell Environmental Protection Act, MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. 
§ 14.528(201)-(207) (West 1970)) or the Sherman and Clayton Antitrust Acts (15 U.S.C. §§ 1-
36 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)). Large agencies interpret and apply detailed environmental 
standards in the first instance, with courts playing a limited back-up role. Superfund is no 
exception. Superfund contemplates deferential judicial review of policymaking, judicial en-
forcement if administrative enforcement fails or is challenged, preserves individuals' common 
law remedies for damages, and provides, as do most environmental regulatory statutes, for 
an immediate resort to the courts by the government when an imminent and substantial 
endangerment threatens natural resources. 
Superfund is also like other environmental statutes in other respects. Superfund copies the 
reporting and information disclosure requirements of other environmental laws, especially 
since the imposition in 1986 in SARA of the public right to know requirements in the wake 
of the Bhopal disaster in India. Shabecoff. Industry To Give Vast New Data On Toxic Perils, 
N. Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1988, at 1, col. 1. In its national contingency plan and national priority 
list, which bring out the systematic and comprehensive side of the statute, Superfund appears 
much like the environmental planning statutes such as the National Environmental Policy 
Act, Federal Policy in Management Act. and the National Forest Management Act. 
424 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 16:405 
task. 73 Not since the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 have 
the federal courts played such a seminal role in shaping a statute 
into a coherent and powerful tool to carry out federal environmental 
objectives. Their aggressive role has obvious implications for the 
future implementation of Superfund's natural resource damage pro-
visions. 
B. The Elements of Federal Remedial and Compensatory 
Legislation 
The emergence of a general federal approach to ameliorative and 
compensatory legislation has ramifications that reach far beyond the 
scope of this Article. Further, the elements of this paradigm are not 
equally applicable to an analysis of Superfund's natural resource 
damage provisions. In brief, the basic elements of this paradigm are: 
1. Liability Standards 
In the federal paradigm, strict and joint and several liability 
are mainstays. Liability without regard to fault is widely ac-
knowledged as vital to the theory of modern accident injury 
compensation. 74 Interestingly, Superfund does not expressly 
mention either strict liability or joint and several liability. Re-
lying on legislative history, the courts have inferred that both 
apply to Superfund. 75 Predecessor statutes providing for oil and 
hazardous substance cleanup in deepwater ports,76 along the 
route of the trans-Alaskan oil pipeline,77 and over the continental 
shelf and other submerged lands,78 impose the same liability. 
2. Funds and Fees 
Federal cleanup funds were established by the 1972 Clean 
Water Act,79 the 1974 Deepwater Port Act,80 the 1978 Oil Spill 
n Glass. Superfund and SARA: Are There Any Defenses Left?, 12 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 
385 (1988). 
74 See generally G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970). 
75 Superfund borrowed the strict liability standard from the oil and hazardous substance 
cleanup program of the Clean Water Act. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(32) (Supp. IV 1986). Interestingly, 
however, the Clean Water Act did not expressly mandate strict liability. The courts inferred 
liability without regard to fault into the statute to fulfill congressional intent under 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1321(0. See, e.g., Steuart Transp. Co. v. Allied Towing Corp., 596 F.2d 609, 613 (4th Cir. 
1979). Likewise, neither Superfund nor the Clean Water Act expressly adopted joint and 
several liability. The courts again had to spell out congressional intent. See United States v. 
A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249 (S.D. Ill. 1984). 
76 Deepwater Port Act of 1974 § 1517(d), (e), 33 U.S.C. § 1517(d), (e) (Supp. IV 1986). 
77 Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act * 1653(a)(1), (c)(1), 43 U.S.C. §§ 1653(a)(1), (c)(1) 
(1982). 
78 Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978 § 1814(a), 43 U.S.C. § 1814(a) 
(1982). 
79 CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(k) (1982). 
8°Id. § 1517(0. 
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Superfund,8! and the 1973 Trans-Alaskan Pipeline Authorization 
Act. 82 Generally, Congress imposed fees on the generators of 
hazards to create and replenish these funds. Although Congress 
designated these funds to. clean up future spills, Superfund 
largely addresses past conduct. In this regard, Superfund more 
clearly resembles the black lung benefits and abandoned mine 
reclamation programs. 83 
3. Government-initiated Remediation 
Superfund's predecessors also placed the burden on the federal 
government of taking direct action, but only if prompt private 
remediation was not possible. 84 Private parties with a defense 
could often recoup their remediation costs from other responsible 
parties. 85 These earlier statutes preserved subrogation and con-
tribution more clearly than in Superfund. 86 
4. Administrative Decisionmaking and Fact Finding 
We live in an "administered" society.87 Under the paradigm 
statutes, federal agencies carry out study and cleanup; they 
control the apportionment of responsibility between state and 
federal governments; they write regulations defining hazard, 
responsible parties, remediation and compensation eligibility, 
and remediation priorities. 
In addition, federal agencies largely determine the role courts 
will play through guidelines and agency enforcement policies. 
Under Superfund, the courts make the final damage awards, but 
the statute authorizes the Department of Interior to write reg-
ulations that provide the district courts with guidelines on the 
sufficiency of evidence or proof necessary to prevail in a natural 
resource damage suit. Such statutory authorization represents 
but one instance of how, under the emerging paradigm, the 
courts' traditional decisionmaking processes are subtly redefined 
to make them more like administrative tribunals than traditional 
common law courts. 
5. Shifting the Burden of Proof 
Whether or not coupled with agency regulations, the practice 
of shifting the burden of going forward with the evidence88 to 
H1 43 U.S.C. § 1812(a), (d) (1982). 
"2 [d. § 1653(c)(4), (5). 
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83 The former requires coal mine operators to pay into a federal fund to compensate pre-
1974 injuries and to be held liable to miners who discover that they have the disease after 
1974, while the latter imposes a fee on the current coal mining industry for cleanup of 
abandoned mines. 30 U.S.C. § 1232 (1982). 
84 33 U.S.C. § 1321(c)(1) (1982). See also Deepwater Ports Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1517(c)(1) (1982). 
H5 33 U.S.C. § 1321(g) (1982). 
86 [d. § 1321(g), (h). The Clean Water Act demonstrates that when Congress wants to 
establish a right, such as contribution, it can do so by express language. 
87 Anderson, Human We(fare and the Administered Society: Federal Regulation in the 
1970s to Protect Health, Safety, and the Environment, in ENVIRONMENTAL AND OCCUPA-
TIONAL MEDICINE (W. Rom, ed. 1983). 
RIl The phrase "burden of proof" loosely refers to three separate burdens that must be 
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the generators of hazards is well established as part of Con-
gress's overall strategy. Legislatures and courts create pre-
sumptions to shift the burden of proof to correct an imbalance 
resulting from one party's superior access to the evidence, to 
favor certain claims for social and economic reasons, and to 
facilitate the prompt resolution of claims.89 To a claimant, such 
a presumption may pose a redoubtable barrier if scientific cau-
sation is difficult to establish between a hazard generator and 
the victim, or if the measure of damages is subject to scientific 
debate over evaluation techniques. 
Of these elements, the first, fourth, and fifth are of primary con-
cern in analyzing Superfund's natural resource damage provisions, 
because Congress made extensive use of them in fashioning the 
natural resource damage recovery mechanism. Nowhere was the 
change more significant-and revealing-than in the departures 
Congress made from historic common law liability requirements. 
IV. SUPERFUND AND THE COMMON LAW 
The relationship between the common law and the natural re-
source damage provisions of Superfund is vital. Modern social wel-
. fare legislation takes the common law as part of its "deep back-
ground. "90 Although Superfund in important respects draws upon 
public works legislation, command-and-control regulation, and disas-
ter and spill programs, the most important source of law with respect 
to interpretation of the natural resource damage provisions has be-
come the common law. In part, Superfund relies so heavily on com-
mon law because the courts are presumed to know and apply the 
common law. In addition, the Department of Interior views the 
common law as a limitation upon how broadly natural resource dam-
age regulations can be written. Courts may disagree with the De-
discharged by a traditional proponent in a court of law: the burden of pleading, the burden of 
production (or going forward with the evidence), and finally the burden of persuasion. The 
second and third burdens are more important than the first. Once allocated, the burden of 
persuasion (the risk of non-persuasion) never shifts, but the burden of going forward with the 
evidence may shift. M. GRAHAM, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE § 301.3, at 43-44 (1987). 
89 
In the creation of presumptions, a reasonable judgment of probabilities is the most 
important consideration. This plays a strong part in the establishment of presump-
tions to aid the claimant injured by hazardous wastes to meet his burden of proof [in 
a compensation proceeding]. In certain recurring fact situations, proof of fact A 
renders inference of fact B so probable that it is sensible and time-saving to presume 
the truth of fact B until the adversary disproves it. 
Superfund Study Group, supra note 11, pt. 2, at 312-39 (Appendix M-1). 
90 1 W. ROGERS, supra note 39, § 3.1, at 173. 
1989] RESOURCE DAMAGES 427 
partment's reading, but, given the language of the legislation, the 
courts may not give claimants the benefit of a rebuttable presump-
tion except where their claims have been made under the regula-
tions. 
If Superfund were heavily based upon traditional common law, 
the common law might act as a brake upon full natural resource 
damage recovery. But, if the statute is not constrained by traditional 
common law doctrines, trustees may succeed in obtaining larger 
awards which can then be applied to natural resources enhancement. 
In fact, Congress enacted Superfund provisions that impose liability 
beyond that required by common law and remove barriers to liability 
that would conventionally be available. Although these provisions 
represent only an awkward attempt to proceed beyond traditional 
common law, federal courts have executed fully the intent behind 
these provisions in the past eight years. 
A. Strict Liability 
The courts and the EPA today maintain that potentially respon-
sible parties are strictly, jointly, and severally liable for cleanup or 
its costS. 91 This liability applies as clearly to natural resource 
cleanup, restoration, and damages as it does to site and spill cleanup 
on private property. 
Common law strict liability and Superfund strict liability resemble 
each other, but only to a point. The salient attribute of common law 
strict liability is that defendants will be found liable even if they 
have not violated any standard of care and even if they are not 
morally blameworthy.92 Through common law strict liability, defen-
dants are forced to internalize the costs of damages that result from 
their activities by incorporating those costs into the price of goods 
or services. 93 Strict liability is not a theory for shifting loss to or for 
punishing a "wrongdoer" but is a means for determining who will 
91 See, e.g., United States v. NEPACCO, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. 
Ct. 146 (1987); United States v. SCDRI, 653 F. Supp. 984 (D. S.C. 1986); United States v. 
Conservation Chern. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162 (W.D. Mo.), further actions in same case, 628 F. 
Supp. 391 (W.D. Mo. 1985), 653 F. Supp. 152 (W.D. Mo. 1986). 
9" See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 75, at 494 (4th ed. 1971). 
9" See, e.g., Cities Service Co. v. State, 312 So. 2d 799, 801 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975). "The 
doctrine of strict liability at its core reflects the judgment that even if some harm is inevitable, 
the social value of some enterprises is greater than their costs, but if an enterprise's benefits 
exceed its costs, fundamental fairness requires at least that profits be net of any harms 
inflicted." F. ANDERSON, D. MANDELKER & A.D. TARLOCK, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: 
LAW AND POLICY 636--37 (1984). 
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ultimately bear the risks associated with activities that, in the 
broader scheme of things, may be socially desirable. 94 
To this point, the two versions of strict liability converge. Beyond 
this point, however, there is a difference between what Congress 
saw in "strict liability" and what the trained common lawyer sees. 
First, common law courts have considerable discretion to decide 
which activities are hazardous. 95 They may balance injury against 
the value of the activity to the community if strict liability is appro-
priate. 96 In contrast, in the Superfund Congress instructed an agency 
to designate which wastes were hazardous and did not provide that 
high social utility would excuse any category of responsible parties. 97 
94 The Senate Committee seemed to say that waste disposers had not been morally culpable 
or negligent in adopting prior waste disposal practices. Discussing the S. 1480 strict liability 
scheme, the Senate Committee Report remarked that often the choice of a responsible party 
is not between an innocent victim and a careless defendant, but between two blameless parties. 
In such cases the costs should be borne by the one of the two innocent parties whose acts 
instigated or made the harm possible. S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 33-34 (1980). 
95 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1977). 
96 Several courts have been unwilling to extend strict liability to the activities that result 
in pollution-related injury, because those activities did not constitute a non-natural use of the 
land. See, e.g., Fritz v. E.!. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 75 A.2d 256 (Del. Super. Ct. 1950); 
Turner v. Big Lake Oil Co., 128 Tex. 155, 96 S. W.2d 221 (1936). Cj. Cities Service Co. v. 
State, 312 So. 2d 799 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (defendant held strictly liable for damages 
resulting when its phosphate slime reservoir broke even though mining activities were common 
in the area). See also, Note, Strict Liability for Generators, Transporters, and Disposers of 
Hazardous Wastes, 64 MINN. L. REV. 949, 969 (1980). 
Fleming James has remarked on the inappropriateness of community values as an additional 
factor to be considered in deciding if an activity is abnormally dangerous. F. JAMES, THE 
LAW OF TORTS § 14.4 (1956). (There is no reason that very valuable, but hazardous, activities 
should be exempted from strict liability; the explanation for the RESTATEMENT approach must 
lie in the inability oftort law to turn entirely away from fault.). The fact that courts purporting 
to apply strict liability consider defendant's conduct and the utility of his activities was not 
lost on environmental groups testifying on CERCLA's progenitors. The groups appraised the 
common law with uncommon insight and accuracy. See Hearings on Hazardous Chemicals 
Under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Before the Subcomm. on Water Resources of 
the House Comm. on Public Works and Transportation, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 188 (1980) 
(statement of A. Blakeman Early, on behalf of the Sierra Club); Hazardous and Toxic Waste 
Disposal: Hearing on S. 1341 and S. 1480 Before the Subcomms. on Envtl. Pollution and 
Resource Protection of the Senate Comm. on Envtl. and Public Works, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 
371 (1979) (statement of the Environmental Defense Fund, et al.). 
97 Congress, in other words, has balanced relevant factors politically and decided to subject 
all statutorily defined hazardous wastes to a strict liability regime. Section 3(a)(1) of S. 1480, 
as reported out of the Senate Committee on Environmental and Public Works, July 11, 1980, 
specifically identified hazardous waste handling activities as ultrahazardous. There are, in the 
legislative history, numerous statements to the effect that for the purpose of CERCLA the 
manufacture, use, transportation, treatment, storage, disposal, and release of hazardous 
substances are ultrahazardous activities. See 126 CONGo REC. H11,799 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980) 
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Second, at common law a plaintiff must prove injury or imminent 
irreparable harm of a substantial nature. 98 The Superfund dispenses 
with this requirement and adopts the preventive and precautionary 
endangerment standard which Congress has placed in most environ-
mental regulatory legislation. 99 
Third, the common law requires the plaintiff to show that the 
defendant's conduct proximately caused injury. 100 In a radical depar-
ture from common law norms, the Superfund does not require proof 
that the waste generated, transported, or otherwise handled by a 
responsible party is the very waste that created a hazardous condi-
tion necessitating response activities. Thus, after incurring response 
costs consistent with the NCP, a plaintiff seeking reimbursement 
need only prove that the defendant is in the class of parties identified 
by the statute. Superfund does not require the plaintiff to prove that 
the defendant's waste was, for example, leaching into the ground-
water. Rather, the plaintiff need only prove that the defendant's 
waste was present at the site that was cleaned up. Hence, Superfund 
liability may be more like enterprise101 or market share102 liability 
than traditional strict liability.103 The explanation for this difference 
in causal analysis is that Superfund provides a remedy for hazardous 
conditions and does not fix liability for ultra-hazardous or abnormally 
dangerous activities.104 
Fourth, a common law plaintiff may be subjected to a variety of 
defenses, including contributory negligence, assumption of the risk, 
(remarks of Rep. Jeffords); 126 CONGo REC. S14,972 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980) (remarks of 
Sen. Tsongas); S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1980). 
98 Note, Imminent Irreparable Injury: A Need for Reform, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 1025, 1030 
(1972). 
99 F. ANDERSON, D. MANDELKER & A.D. TARLOCK, supra note 93, at 505-06. 
100 See, e.g., Anderson V. Minneapolis, St. P. & S.S.M. Ry., 146 Minn. 430, 179 N.W. 45 
(1920) ("but for" test of causation), aff'd per curiam, 150 Minn. 530, 185 N. W. 299 (1921); 
Stubbs V. City of Rochester, 226 N.Y. 516, 124 N.E. 137 (1919) (substantial factor sufficient). 
101 See Hall V. E.!. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), similar 
severed case appealed, Ball V. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 519 F.2d 715 (6th Cir. 1975). 
102 See Sind ell V. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980). 
103 Perhaps Congress adopted this approach because use alone contributes to the hazardous 
condition overall without need for an actual or threatened release of the user's wastes them-
selves. Or perhaps Congress sought to impose the ultimate burden of cleanup on the present 
members of industries which have benefited from doing business in hazardous wastes, delim-
ited only by a requirement that some industry members have used the site. 
104 See, e.g., Artesian Water Co. v. New Castle County, 659 F. Supp. 1269, 1298-99 (D. 
Del. 1987); United States V. Miami Drum Serv., Inc., 25 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1469 (S.D. 
Fla. 1986). 
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public duty of the defendant to engage in the activity, a plaintiff's 
unusual sensitivity, and intervening acts of others.105 In contrast, 
Superfund defenses under the reimbursement provisions are exclu-
sive and different. 106 Finally, Superfund imposes financial liability 
limits unknown to the common law. 107 
As these differences illustrate, strict liability, a statutory doctrine 
imbedded in a modern administered welfare statute, departs signif-
icantly from the common law under Superfund. Common law bal-
ancing, causal requirements, defenses, and the like have no place in 
the statutory scheme. 108 Congress's plan for implementing the stat-
105 Note, Strict Liability for Generators, Transporters and Disposers of Hazardous Wastes, 
64 MINN. L. REV. 949, 976-77 (1980). 
106 CERCLA § 107(b) limits defenses to acts of God, acts of war, and acts or omissions of 
certain third parties. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1982). Section 522 of both Restatements of Torts 
have consistently stated that one conducting an ultrahazardous or abnormally dangerous 
activity is liable for harm even if the harm "is caused by the unexpectable (a) innocent, 
negligent or reckless conduct of a third person, or ... (c) operation of a force of nature." 
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 522 (1938); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 522 (1977). In a 
caveat, the Institute has declined to express an opinion whether harm resulting from a third 
party act deliberately intended to bring harm about should be a defense to a claim of strict 
liability. 
107 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c)(1) (1982). 
108 Certain sections of CERCLA affirmatively support imposition of a unique legislative 
type of "strict liability. " Yet a judge trying to find specific statutory text indicating congres-
sional intent to impose broad strict liability can grasp at only a few fragments; Congress left 
its texts incomplete in what must be called a mess. 
Section 107 does declare forthrightly that four classes of responsible parties "shall be liable 
for" the cleanup costs associated with hazardous waste sites and for certain damages to natural 
resources. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Section 107 does not establish a 
standard of care for responsible parties, nor does it or its legislative history contain any 
suggestion that proof of reasonable care, or even utmost care, would absolve an astonishingly 
diverse array of parties-including those with extremely tenuous connections with sites-
from the cost of cleanup. The defenses that are available to responsible parties-acts of war, 
God, and certain third parties-are not typical of the type of defenses that would be available 
if the § 107 plaintiff had to prove negligence. For example, if the standard of liability were 
negligence, one would expect that contributory negligence or assumption of the risk would 
constitute defenses. Yet § 107(b) precludes such defenses. [d. § 9607(b). A standard of neg-
ligence is involved in § 107(b)(3) which provides that an otherwise responsible party shall not 
be liable when the actual or threatened release is the result of "an act or omission of a third 
party other than an employee or agent of the defendant, or than one whose act or omission 
occurs in connection with a contractual relationship ... with the defendant (except where the 
sole contractual arrangement [is with) a common carrier by rail), if the defendant establishes 
... that he (a) exercised due care ... and (b) took precautions against foreseeable acts or 
omissions .... " [d. § 9607(b)(3). The mention of a single fault-based defense for a common 
carrier contractor for waste shipment by rail shows strict liability is the rule, not the exception. 
See id. The third-party defense of CERCLA § 107(b)(3) relieves disposers of responsibility 
for the consequences of the conduct of parties unrelated to them either by contract, agency, 
or employment unless their acts or omissions were foreseeable. [d. The common-carrier-by-
rail exception is the only time the defendants' due care will be available as a defense where 
privity exists. Plausible policy reasons for exempting defendants from liability for shipments 
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ute would be disrupted if the government had to meet traditional 
common law standards regarding balancing, injury, causality, and 
defenses each time it brought an action. Superfund's "strict liability" 
thus reflects a unique statutory policy. Despite its uniqueness, the 
by rail but not by truck were not offered. In short, § 107 creates unique statutory liabilities 
and defenses. See id. 
Because Superfund was hastily passed and inartfully worded, and perhaps because the 
members of Congress involved were not particularly well trained in the common law, a few 
problems still exist with this interpretation. Nowhere does the statute plainly state that 
responsible parties are liable without regard to fault for the cost or execution of cleanup. 
Indeed, language to this effect was removed from earlier versions of the statute. "Any person 
who caused or contributed to the release or threatened release shall be strictly liable for such 
costs, damages and losses .... Such liability shall be joint and several with any other person 
who caused or contributed to such release." H.R. 7020, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3071(a)(1), 126 
CONGo REC. 26,779 (1980). H.R. 7020 was passed by the House on September 23, 1980 with 
§ 3071 intact. 126 CONGo REC. 26,799 (1980). Another CERCLA predecessor, S. 1480 (as 
introduced July 11, 1979), also contained specific mention of strict, joint and several liability. 
Section 4(a) read, in pertinent part, "any other person who caused or contributed or is causing 
or contributing to such discharge . . . shall be jointly, severally and strictly liable .... " 
S. 1480, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 125 CONGo REC. S17,991 (daily ed. July 11, 1979). Instead, 
CERCLA declared that the standard of liability under the Act should be the same as that 
which applied under § 311 of the Clean Water Act. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(32) (1982 & Supp. IV 
1986) (adopting the standard of liability set forth in 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1982». Although § 311 
did not, by express terms, establish a standard of "strict liability," it has been so interpreted 
by the courts. See, e.g., United States v. Leboef Brothers Towing Co., 621 F.2d 787,789 (5th 
Cir. 1980); Steuart Transp. Co. v. Allied Towing Corp., 596 F.2d 609,613 (4th Cir. 1979). The 
debate on the final House version of the legislation contained an unchallenged letter to 
Congressman Florio from Stan A. Parker, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legislative 
Affairs, who wrote that "caselaw [sic] construing Section 311 clearly indicates that not only 
are the defenses to be narrowly construed but the plain meaning of the liability regime 
establishes a strict liability standard. See Steuart Transportation . .. [and] Burgess v. MIV 
Tamano, 564 F.2d 964 (1st Cir. 1977)." 126 CONGo REC. Hll,788 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980) 
(remarks of Rep. Florio). The legislative history indicates that Congress perceived that it was 
adopting a standard of strict liability for parties that were held responsible under the Act. 
See, e.g., 126 CONGo REC. S14,964 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980) (remarks of Sen. Randolph); 126 
CONGo REC. Hll,787 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980) (remarks of Rep. Florio). 
Some legislative history indicates that Congress wanted to adopt the common law standard 
of liability. For example, Congressman Gore discoursed extensively on the history and rea-
soning behind strict liability beginning with Rylands v. Fletcher, 3 L.R.-E. & 1. App. 330 
(H.L. 1868), to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1977), to the applicability of strict 
liability to the modern day problem of hazardous wastes. 126 CONGo REC. H4,195 (daily ed. 
Sept. 4, 1980); 126 CONGo REC. H9,461 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1980). Still, a wider view of the 
statute's purpose and its legislative history suggest that Congress borrowed the phrase simply 
to explain that the Superfund scheme was not fault-based and that enterprises which benefit 
from hazardous waste disposal will be expected collectively to internalize the costs of cleaning 
up past disposal. "Strict liability, the foundation of S. 1480, assumes that those who benefit 
financially from a commercial activity internalize the health and environmental costs of that 
activity into the costs of doing business. Strict liability is an important instrument in allocating 
the risks imposed upon society by the manufacture, transportation, use and disposal of 
inherently hazardous substances." S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1980). "The most 
desirable system of loss distribution is one in which the prices of goods accurately reflect their 
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federal district and circuit courts seem almost unanimously to have 
endorsed this view. 109 
B. Joint and Several Liability 
A second intriguing example of the interplay of common law and 
legislation exists in Congress's handling of joint and several liability 
in Superfund. Joint and several liability and strict liability followed 
virtually identical paths of legislative evolution. llo As with strict 
full costs to society." [d. at 34. "The Stafford-Randolph compromise does not create new costs. 
lt puts the costs on the sector most responsible for pollution and which benefits most from 
chemical production instead of on the victim or on the government, as it stands now." 126 
CONGo REC. S14,972 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980) (remarks of Sen. Tsongas). Nothing more, 
nothing less. If Congress meant anything more, it failed utterly to say so. 
lt is also true that the rationale offered for removing express strict liability was to leave 
the common law undisturbed. See infra note 171 and accompanying text (Simpson-Stafford 
colloquy). But this seems to be an afterthought, offered up to obscure the real reason the 
phrase was removed: the bill's opponents could be placated to some extent by making the 
statute less explicit, a classic gambit used to secure passage of controversial legislation, no 
matter how much it may vex the justices. As we have seen, the common law was modified in 
five important aspects in Superfund. 
109 Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft, Significant CERCLA Decisions During the Past Year 
1-2 (1987) (unpublished memorandum on file with author). 
110 Again, the statute does not explicitly impose joint and several liability; the phrase never 
appears in the statute. CERCLA § 101(32), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(32) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), 
adopted the "standard of liability" of the Clean Water Act § 311, 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1982), but 
unlike strict liability, joint and several liability arguably is not a "standard" of liability. Even 
if CWA § 311 does govern whether joint and several liability is to be applied under CERCLA, 
CWA § 311 seems to authorize rather than mandate a court to impose it. "Opinion of counsel" 
letters from the Department of Justice and the Coast Guard obtained by Rep. Florio and 
inserted in the final House debates so argue. 126 CONGo REC. H11,788-89 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 
1980) (letter of Alan A. Parker, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legislative Affairs, and 
G.H. Patrick Bursley, Chief Counsel, U.S. Coast Guard) [hereinafter Parker]. Mr. Parker 
argued that because CWA § 311 allowed contribution, one must assume joint and several 
liability. He went on to argue that since CERCLA § 107(e)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e)(2) (1982), 
confirms a right to contribution, joint and several liability is implied under CERCLA. Parker, 
supra. Opportunities for the imposition of joint and several liability under CWA § 311 pre-
sumably are rare, because most oil spills involve but a single source. lt appears that at the 
time CERCLA was enacted, no court had interpreted CWA § 311 as imposing joint and 
several liability. But see United States V. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1254-55 
(S.D. Ill. 1984) (relying on § 311 in determining that CERCLA imposed common law standards 
of joint and several liability). Likewise, Congress explicitly required joint and several liability 
in the draft bills, but dropped it from the final legislation, as it did a statutory right to 
contribution. Both § 3701(a)(2) of H.R. 7020 and § 4(a) of S. 1480 contained express provisions 
establishing strict, joint, and several liability. The legislative history indicates that Congress 
intended to impose joint and several liability. Although Senator Helms argued that the deletion 
of the joint and several language from the compromise bill that became CERCLA meant that 
such liability was not to be applied under the Act, 126 CONG. REC. S15,004 (daily ed. Nov. 
24, 1980), the better view is expressed by the sponsors of the bill. Senator Helms was an 
opponent of the bill, therefore his statements are entitled to little weight in construing the 
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liability, Congress was unclear what it intended by applying a com-
mon law concept sub silentio in a complex environmental cleanup 
statute. On the one hand, it seemed to want joint and several liability 
to follow "traditional and evolving principles of common law. "111 On 
the other hand, the active participants in the legislative process 
appeared to be completely unaware of the confusing diversity of 
common law on point.112 Perhaps sensing this confusion, the chief 
House sponsor indicated that the bill would encourage the develop-
ment of a federal common law of joint and several liability. 113 Those 
following the debate believed that the courts would allow the gov-
ernment to collect its expenses or impose cleanup tasks on one or a 
few responsible parties and exit the case. There was no discussion 
of apportionment, that is, whether and to what extent each respon-
sible party's share could be easily identified. These parties appar-
ently would obtain court-supervised contribution from the remaining 
parties. 
The state law weaves a tangled web, despite facile reference to 
black-letter rules contained in the Restatement of Torts by some 
statute. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185,204 n.24 (1976). The district courts have 
discussed an intent to make joint and several liabilities available. See, e.g., New York v. Shore 
Realty Corp., 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1430, 1431 n.6 (E.D.N.Y. 1984); United States v. 
Stringfellow, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,385, 20,386 n.5 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 1984); 
United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1254 (S.D. Ill. 1984). Again, 
Superfund's language and structure lend some support to joint and several liability with a 
right to contribution. Section 107(a) provides a list of four classes of persons who "shall be 
liable for" the response costs incurred in a hazardous waste site cleanup. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). 
The Act does not provide that CERCLA § 107 parties "shall be liable for" the costs associated 
with their actions only. Also, CWA § 311 arguably imposes joint and several liability. 
The old § 107(a)(4)(B), however, did suggest a right to contribution among liable parties. 
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (Supp. IV 1980). That section provided that § 107 parties shall be 
liable for all other response costs incurred by any other person consistent with the National 
Contingency Plan (NCP), 42 U.S.C. § 9605 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
111 126 CONGo REc. H11,787 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980) (remarks of Rep. Florio); 126 CONGo 
REc. S14,964 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980) (remarks of Sen. Randolph). 
112 Take, for instance, Senator Randolph himself. Nowhere does he acknowledge the great 
diversity of state common law. Further, he says that after deletion of joint and several liability 
the existing common law will govern several liability. 126 CONGo REc. S14,964 (daily ed. Nov. 
24, 1980). The key issue was joint liability. He states the common law will resolve issues of 
liability not resolved by the act-"if any." Id. And he refers to the liability of "joint tort 
feasors," although the commission of a tort is clearly not required, for example, for liability 
under § 107(a). Id. Contrast 126 CONGo REc. H9461-68 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1980) (remarks of 
Mr. Gore). 
11q26 CONGo ~EC. H11,787 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980) (remarks of Rep. Florio) (identifying 
policy motivations "to insure the development of a uniform rule and to discourage business 
dealing in hazardous substances from locating primarily in states with lenient laws"). Id. Of 
course, a federal common law of cost allocation for abandoned and inactive sites would have 
no incentive effect with respect to the problem at hand. 
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federal district courts in Superfund cases. 114 Many members of Con-
gress might have been surprised to learn that, under the common 
law most applicable to the waste site cleanup problem, the state 
court nuisance decisions, the rule allowed no joint and several lia-
bility as recently as thirty years ago. Rather, the court had to 
apportion. 115 Moreover, some jurisdictions still insist that courts 
must apportion independently-caused nuisance damages according 
to each defendant's share, stoutly maintaining in a triumph of reason 
over experience that in all cases the nuisance theoretically is no more 
or less than the sums of its discrete parts, and that the court must 
isolate each part, despite the practical problems of proof that often 
arise. 
Debate over the fine points of state common and statutory law 
governing joint and several liability and contribution may "have 
heretofore been reserved to the quiet halls of academe and tweedy 
law professors," but, for a long time after CERCLA was enacted, 
practitioners and government lawyers spoke of little else. 116 The 
debate was occasioned by Congress's silence on the issue of what 
law governed. Had the federal district courts applied the existing 
state common law of joint and several liability, apportionment, and 
contribution in deciding reimbursement and cleanup cases, chaos 
would have resulted. Instead, because Congress kept the common 
law well in the "deep background," the federal courts were able to 
begin to fashion a federal common law. 
V. ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONMAKING AND FACT FINDING 
UNDER SUPERFUND 
Superfund contains a provision that, on close analysis, may prove 
to be the most salient example in federal law of the alteration (some 
might say the corruption) of evidentiary standards to serve a legis-
lative policy goal. The provision authorizes the Department of In-
terior to write regulations that, in effect, direct the courts to give 
extra weight to evidence on natural resource damage that is com-
puted in a particular manner using approved methodologies. 117 
114 United States v. Chern-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 810 (S.D. Ohio 1983). 
115 W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 52 (4th ed. 1971); Jackson, Joint Torts 
and Several Liability, 17 TEX. L. REV. 399 (1939); Note, Joint and Several Liability for 
Hazardous Waste Releases Under Superfund, 68 VA. L. REV. 1157, 1166-68 (1982). 
116 Rodberg, Apportionment of Damages in Hazardous Waste Litigation, in HAZARDOUS 
WASTE LITIGATION 184, 185 (1982). 
117 Supra note 25 (type A and type B rules). 
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Because of this alteration of evidentiary standards, the Depart-
ment of Interior's regulations could become a sort of "primer" or 
scientific evidentiary manual instructing federal judges about how 
to analyze and apply complex technical methodologies for assess-
ments of natural resource injuries. This provision, make no mistake, 
is highly novel. Courts are used to reviewing agency actions to 
determine if they are within the law, if the agency has based formal 
decisions on the substantial evidence in the agency's record, or if 
more informal determinations are reasonable and may not be said, 
in the ritualistic phrase, to be arbitrary and capricious. 118 
But it is quite another thing to authorize a federal agency to give 
a federal judge detailed directions on how to think about expert 
testimony in a plenary trial court action for damages. Some judges 
may become confused, even a little truculent. They may feel that 
they know a thing or two about how to find facts in a trial on the 
evidence. If Congress wanted the agency to determine the facts, 
judges may reason, then it could have vested the decision in an 
agency tribunal. On judicial review, the court then would gladly 
defer to the agency. 
Not only may courts balk, exact statutory precedents apparently 
do not exist for the natural resource damages regulations. Congress 
has considered authorizing agencies to write regulations that give 
evidentiary weight to endorsement by federal agencies of particular 
personal injury etiologies and methodologies. The author made such 
a proposal in testimony to Congress in 1978. 119 The twelve-member 
congressional study commission on toxic injury compensation en-
dorsed the concept in 1982120 and similar proposals appear in model 
state statutes121 and articles. 122 The heart of such proposals are 
federal agency regulations, variously called "criteria documents," 
"presumption documents," or "carcinogen catalogs," that would draw 
upon the literature on toxic substances and would certify to the trial 
court that a toxicant's disease-causing characteristics merit generous 
118 See Administrative Procedure Act § 706, 5 U.S.C. § 555 (1982). 
119 Toxic Substances Control Act Amendments: Hearings on H.R. 9616 Before the Sub-
comm. on Consumer Protection and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign 
Commerce, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 348 (1978) (statement of Frederick R. Anderson, President, 
Environmental Law Institute). 
120 Superfund Study Group, supra note 11, pt. l. 
121 Trauberman, Statutory Reform of "Toxic Torts": Relieving Legal, Scientific, and Eco-
nomic Burdens on the Chemical Victim, 7 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 177 (1983). 
122 Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law" Vision of 
the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849 (1984); Note, Tort Actions for Cancer: Deterrence, 
Compensation, and Environmental Carcinogenesis, 90 YALE L.J. 840,855 (1981). 
,r--------------
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statutory presumptions and burden shifts that the court would apply 
in finding the facts and determining awards. 
The Superfund's natural resource damage regulations and the re-
buttable presumption parallel each other exactly. The problems that 
natural resource trustees have in proving substantial but difficult-
to-measure environmental harms to public natural resources war-
ranted both assistance for the courts by an expert agency, on the 
one hand, and presumptive, preferential evidentiary weight for the 
agency's determinations, on the other hand, even if Congress chose 
to vest the final word in the courts and not in the agency. 
VI. BURDEN OF PROOF AND THE REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION 
A procedural innovation can have as large or greater an impact 
on the outcome of a trial as can a doctrinal shift, as common law 
judges realized long ago. Borrowing from the courts, legislatures 
have mandated burden shifting in modern welfare statutes to pro-
mote policy objectives. In adopting the device of shifting the burden 
of proof, however, legislatures have sometimes strayed quite far 
from the burden shifting that the courts first employed in jury trials. 
As with the doctrines of strict liability and joint and several liability, 
Congress in Superfund adopted a burden-shifting rebuttable pre-
sumption that goes far afield from traditional procedural devices for 
allocating power to the judge and jury. 123 
Ordinarily, the plaintiff bears the burden of going forward with 
the evidence at every point in a trial. 124 But the courts and legisla-
tures created rebuttable presumptions to shift the burden of proof 
to correct the imbalance resulting from one party's superior access 
to the evidence, to facilitate the prompt resolution of claims, and to 
favor certain claims for social and economic reasons. 125 These pur-
poses were more easily achieved by reallocating power between 
judge and jury, which was the primary impact of creating presump-
tions. 
A. Burden of Proof" The Judge v. the Jury 
Power between judge and jury was realigned by reducing the 
otherwise heavy burden that a plaintiff would bear in going forward 
with the evidence at trial. In a jury trial, the rebuttable presumption 
123 Supra note 24 (rebuttable presumption). 
124 See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
125 See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
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ordinarily has the effect of getting the claim to the jury more rapidly 
and under more favorable jury instructions than would otherwise be 
the case. 126 In adopting a rebuttable presumption in Superfund, 
Congress intended to give the trustees a better chance of prevailing 
in cases involving difficult-to-prove ecological damage. By creating 
this presumption, then, Congress has placed its imprimatur on fed-
eral administrative determinations of methodology and fact. 
The Superfund prescription goes further, however. The new pre-
scription departs significantly from the current rules applicable to 
rebuttable presumptions in general. Under the current federal rule 
of evidence applicable to rebuttable presumptions,127 the intent, and 
certainly the effect, of the rule is to increase the number of cases 
decided by a jury. The policy of the rule is to increase the power of 
the jury in deciding factual controversies by reducing the power of 
the judge. By applying presumptions, a judge may try to keep a 
controversy from the jury or may try to require it to decide the case 
in a particular way. 128 
Nevertheless, under Superfund it is unlikely that jury trials will 
occur, despite the Supreme Court's recent decision in Tull v. United 
States 129 and despite dicta in a recent Eighth Circuit decision to the 
effect that natural resource damages are "legal" in nature and there-
fore require a jury trial.l30 No court has permitted a jury trial as 
yet in an action for Superfund response costS. 131 One reason for no 
126 
[T]he burden of proof [persuasion] is in practice largely a question of the proper 
phrasing of jury instructions; the burden of producing evidence determines whether 
the case is to be decided by the judge or the jury. Second, the issue of burden of 
proof arises only at the time of jury instructions, while the burden of producing 
evidence is at issue any time one or the other of the parties asks for a preemptory 
ruling from the court; i.e., on motions for nonsuit, directed verdict, or judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict. Third, the burden of proof can be shifted only as the 
result of the proof of a presumption, while the burden of producing evidence can 
switch from one side to the other as the result of the introduction of evidence as well 
as by operation of a presumption. 
21 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5122, at 558 (1977). 
127 FED. R. EVID. 30l. 
128 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 126, at 572-73. 
129 Tull v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 831 (1987). For a discussion of the impact of the Tull 
decision on the Superfund program, see also Slavitt, Jury Trial Rights Under CERCLA: The 
Effect of Tull v. U.s., 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,127 (1988). 
130 Continental Ins. Cos. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chern. Co., 842 F.2d 977,986-
87 (8th Cir. 1988); See also United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chern. Co., 810 
F.2d 726, 749 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding that because federal government's effort to recover 
response costs under CERCLA and RCRA constituted a request for equitable relief and not 
for legal damages, defendants had no right to a jury trial), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 146 (1987). 
131 See United States v. Ward, 23 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1391, 1413 (E.D.N.C. 1985); 
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jury is that cleanup costs are "equitable" in nature, that is, resto-
rative and restitutive, and do not penalize conduct so as to trigger 
a constitutionally guaranteed jury trial. 132 
In addition, all "damages" recovered under Superfund, even "dam-
ages" for lost use between the time of injury and the time a final 
judicial determination is made, must be spent on repair or replace-
ment of the lost natural resources. 133 These statutorily required 
expenditures fulfill the traditional equitable purpose of restitution. 
This interpretation of the statute is also supported by recent Su-
preme Court cases holding that, where Congress has created modern 
statutory "public rights," these rights do not fall within the category 
of rights that the Founders intended to protect by jury trial. 134 
Finally, Superfund itself implies that a jury trial will not be avail-
able, because the statute authorizes the rebuttable presumption, not 
only in claims brought to court, but also in administrative determi-
nations, in which no jury ever sits. 135 The availability of the pre-
sumption in administrative proceedings provides further evidence 
that Congress did not have traditional presumptions in mind, with 
their emphasis on judge-jury interactions, when it enacted the nat-
ural resource damage presumption. 
B. Use of Rebuttable Presumptions in Other Federal and State 
Statutes 
Modern legislative burden shifting has served not only to reallo-
cate power between judge and jury but to move well beyond the 
strictures of causal proof which the common law requires. Presump-
tions that appear in numerous state workers' compensation laws 
almost always have survived judicial challenge,136 as have the gen-
erous presumptions that Congress placed in legislation to compen-
United States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898, 913 (D. N.H. 1985) and cases cited therein; United 
States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chern. Co., 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. 
denied, 108 S. Ct. 146. But see Tull v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 831 (1987) (question ofliability 
under CWA § 404 permit violation warrants jury trial; no right to jury trial on question of 
penalty, however). 
132 U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
133 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1). 
134 See Commodity Future Trading Comm. v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 847-58 (1986); Thomas 
v. Union Carbide Agricultural Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 584-93 (1985); Northern Pipeline 
Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. 50, 62-76 (1982). 
135 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(2)(C). 
136 For decisions and cases involving over ten state statutes, see SUPERFUND STUDY GROUP, 
supra note 11, pt. 2, at 325, 336-37. For a discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of 
presumption in state occupational disease compensation statutes, see Note, Compensating 
Victims of Occupational Disease, 93 HARV. L. REV. 916 (1980). 
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sate coal mine workers for "black lung" disease. 137 Such state and 
federal statutes shed light on how courts may interpret the Super-
fund's provision for a rebuttable presumption favoring the natural 
resource trustee's claim, and on how the Department of Interior 
might revise its natural resource damage regulations. 
The presumptions in these statutes ensure that a wide variety of 
personal injuries are fully compensable and make a claimant's burden 
quite light in most instances. In fact, the trend is so strong that 
critics now claim that, if legislatures continue to replace traditional 
tort law causation and fault requirements with no-fault recovery 
funded by entities with only a tenuous connection with the injury, 
economic incentive and affordable insurance will disappear. 138 
Whether or not the critics are correct, Superfund's rebuttable pre-
sumption for natural resource damage deserves the same generous 
interpretation that other state and federal legislatively mandated 
rebuttable presumptions have received. 
The expansiveness of modern legislative burden shifting can per-
haps be illustrated best by examining briefly the 1970 federal legis-
lation to compensate victims of black lung disease, a respiratory 
condition that afflicts miners and families who have breathed coal 
dust for long periods of time. 139 The Secretary of Health and Human 
Services defines black lung disability by regulation, just as the Sec-
retary of the Interior issues natural resource damage regulations 
under Superfund. Presumptions favor a claimant seeking recovery 
for death, black lung disease (pneumoconiosis), or respiratory im-
pairment,140 just as a natural resource trustee enjoys a rebuttable 
presumption if a claim for damages is made under the Department 
of Interior's regulations. 
For pre-1974 injuries, black lung claimants could proceed against 
a federal fund analogous to Superfund (and taxed to the mining 
industry).141 Beginning in 1974, black lung claimants must usually 
recover under state worker compensation laws or from mine oper-
I:l7 Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1,23-27 (1975). 
138 Schmalz, Super funds and Tort Reforms: Are They Insurable?, 38 Bus. LAW 175, 176-
79 (1982). 
139 Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-941, 951, 958 (1976 
& Supp. V 1981), as amended by Black Lung Benefits Reform Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-
239, 92 Stat. 95 (1978). In particular, see § 921(c)(l), (2), (4). 
140 The five original presumptions appeared at 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(1)-(5). For discussion, see 
also LARSEN, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 41,195(a), at 7-527 to 7-528; Su-
PERFUND STUDY GROUP, supra note 11, pt. 2, at 326--30. In 1981, Congress eliminated all 
but the first and third of these presumptions. Trust Fund Code of 1981, 26 U.S.C. §§ 9500-
9503 (1982), amended as 26 U.S.C. §§ 9501-9509 (Supp. IV 1986). 
141 SUPERFUND STUDY GROUP, supra note 11, pt. 2, at 118-24. 
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ators, the analogues to the Superfund's potentially responsible par-
ties. 142 Similarly, after 1986, natural resource trustees must proceed 
directly against potentially responsible parties. 143 For recovery from 
operators, black lung claimants must use the procedural provisions 
of an older and yet more sweeping federal compensation statute, 
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act,144 a strict 
liability, employment-based statute providing for death benefits, per-
manent total and partial disability, and medical services. This latter 
statute also calls for regulations. Further, if a claimant merely es-
tablishes the fact of injury, a statutory presumption arises that all 
other relevant requirements for compensation have been met. Only 
substantial evidence to the contrary can rebut the presumption. 145 
The draft Superfund legislation also included a rebuttable pre-
sumption favoring the personal injury claimant. 146 The personal in-
jury provision was removed at the last moment. Significantly, the 
bill listed over a dozen types of injury for which damages would be 
recoverable, in addition to natural resource damage. 147 The rebutt-
able presumption was to facilitate recovery for medical expenses. 148 
Only natural resources survived the final triage, probably because 
natural resource damage recovery was popular with state govern-
ments. Victim groups were not well organized at the time. 
VII. ApPLICATION OF THE NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGE 
PROVISIONS BY THE AGENCIES AND THE COURTS 
Congress intended Superfund to be interpreted broadly. The 
courts have held that Superfund made potentially responsible parties 
even minimally involved with waste sites and spills individually, 
collectively, and strictly liable for all aspects of an agency-designed 
cleanup, by whomever performed, and whatever the cost.149 In this 
light, Superfund is a federal bill collectors' statute, identifying such 
a broad group of debtors that Congress may have reached the limit 
142 Id. 
143 See supra note 26. 
144 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1972) 
145 SUPERFUND STUDY GROUP, supra note 11, pt. 2, at 125 (App. D.). 
146 S. 1480, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 4(a) (1980). 
147 See infra note 165 and accompanying text. 
148 S. 1480, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 4(c)(2)(A) (1980); see also S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 
2d Sess. 43 (1980), reprinted in 1 SUPERFUND: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (Envtl. L. lnst. 
1983) (once presumption created, defendant must present counter proof before plaintiff's claim 
may be dismissed). 
149 See generally Glass, supra note 73, at 385. 
--- ---------........ 
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of the constitutionally required rational nexus that must exist be-
tween the objectives of legislation and the scheme adopted to achieve 
them. Traditional fault-based theories of liability, defenses, causal 
requirements, measure of damage limitations, and procedural limits 
do not apply. 
If Congress intended for these limitations to apply to the natural 
resource provisions, it gave no indication. Before the November 1980 
elections, Congress was moving toward a simple and inclusive theory 
for the Superfund legislation: for every site or spill, complete re-
mediation; for every injury already sustained by public or private 
property or persons, compensation. After the election, all damage 
compensation provisions were dropped-except damages to public 
natural resources. For them, the inclusive approach of the statute 
remained. 
A. Department of Interior's Interpretation of the Natural 
Resource Damage Provisions 
The Department of Interior has moved slowly and cautiously to-
ward implementation of the regulations for damage recovery. Re-
lying upon what it believes to be the common law rule, the Depart-
ment has interpreted the statute to limit damage awards to either 
the diminution in value of a resource or the cost of replacing or 
restoring the resource, whichever is less. 150 In addition, the Depart-
ment's regulations award damages for harms incurred from the date 
of injury to the time awards are made for diminished use or resto-
ration and replacement. 
The Department's "either/or" rule severely constricts the natural 
resource damage recovery program, although other departmental 
interpretations of the natural resource damage provisions also re-
strict their effectiveness. Much hinges upon the Department's inter-
150 The natural resource damage assessment regulations, 43 C.F.R. pt. 11 (1986), require 
the resource trustee to choose one of two economic methodologies for measuring damages. 
[d. § 11.33 (1987). The trustee is to select the lesser of replacement/restoration cost or 
diminution in use values as the measure of damages. [d. § 11.35(b)(2). When restoration or 
replacement of the damaged resource is not "technically feasible," damages are to be measured 
by diminution in use values only. [d. § 11.35(b)(3). Amendments to the damage assessment 
rules to conform to SARA have been published in final form, to take effect on March 23, 1988. 
Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 53 Fed. Reg. 5166 (1988). 
Section 11.84(g)(1) of the damage assessment regulations provides that "if restoration or 
replacement is to form the basis of the measure of damages, the diminution of use values 
during the period of time required to obtain restoration or replacement may also be included 
in the measure of damages." Subsection (g)(2) describes the procedures for calculating the 
diminution in use values. 
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pretation of the statute. First, the interpretation precludes a trustee 
from pursuing either restoration or replacement costs when lost use 
seems small or lost use values when restoration or replacement 
damage is small. While this Article focuses upon the former problem, 
that is, the unavailability of restoration and replacement costs under 
the restrictive rule, some resource economists are just as concerned 
about limitations upon full recovery of lost use values. 151 The De-
partment's approach also precludes mixed solutions such as some 
lost use compensation, some restoration, and some replacement. 
Second, the techniques mandated by the Department for valuing 
lost uses will often produce a lower damage estimate. Thus, resto-
ration and replacement damages, while more reasonable and much 
easier to compute, will be awarded infrequently.152 Lost use values 
will be small because the rules permit only uses, strictly construed, 
to be counted. For example, if a lost resource has a value to citizens 
who do not use it but value its existence,153 or who want future use 
reserved as an option for future generations,154 these "non-use" val-
ues cannot be included in the damage assessment. Technically, the 
Department permits lost non-use values to be counted, but only 
when lost use values cannot be computed. Economists, however, 
151 See Yang, Valuing Natural Resource Damages: Economics for CERCLA Lawyers, 14 
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,311, 10,314-15 (1984). 
152 See Kenison, Buchholz, and Mulligan, State Actions for Natural Resource Damages: 
Enforcement of the Public Trust, 17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,437-39 (1987). The 
authors, all in the Colorado Attorney General's office at the time their article was written, 
covered the major criticisms. In addition to their observation that the Department's definition 
of injury stresses physical and biological change instead of loss of public "services" (uses) of 
the damaged resource, see discussion at id. at 10,437. The authors point out that: 
The requirements that: (a) restrict measurements of natural resource damages to 
resources that have "committed uses," (b) limit damages to cost of restoration or lost 
value of "public" services, (c) limit use of intrinsic values only as a substitute for use 
value rather than as an additional category of value, (d) set an arbitrary and man-
datory preference among measurement methods and (e) fail to include a flexible 
measure of damages for "special resources," will significantly bias the damages re-
coverable by state and federal trustees. 
Id.-at 10,437. 
See also the moving papers in National Wildlife Fed'n v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, No. 
87-1266 (D.C. Cir.) (lawsuit challenging the natural resource guideline). 
The unrealistic discount rate mandated by the Department for use in Superfund natural 
resource damage computations is criticized in d'Arge, Marking Time with CERCLA: Eco-
nomic Evaluation of Assessing Past, Present, and Future Damages of Hazardous Wastes, 
paper prepared for the Resources for the Future Conference (Washington, D.C. June 16-17, 
1988). The problem, however, transcends Superfund and affects discounting in all federal 
programs. See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, DISCOUNT RATES To BE USED IN 
EVALUATING TIME DISTRIBUTED COST AND BENEFITS (Circular A-94 Mar. 27, 1972). 
153 See supra note 5. 
154 See supra note 6. 
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have never developed successful techniques for measuring non-use 
values alone, leaving use values out of the calculus. Their techniques 
wrap use and non-use values together to yield total values lost. 
Third, the Department's interpretation of the natural resource 
damage provisions also restricts the provisions' effectiveness be-
cause, existence and option values aside, the techniques for comput-
ing just the lost use values are beset with major conceptual difficul-
ties and measurement uncertainties. As a result, the techniques 
themselves tend to undervalue lost natural resources so that full 
restoration and replacement damages cannot be recovered. 155 A sam-
pling of measurement techniques sketches the case for primary use 
of restoration and replacement measures of damages. Rather than 
instruct the Department of Interior in detail as to the content of a 
new rule, the purpose of this Article is to demonstrate that Super-
fund does not require the restrictive choice of the lesser of lost use 
value or restoration/replacement as the measure of Superfund nat-
ural resource damages. 
All methods approved by the Department focus on lost consump-
tive (for example, lumber, fish, game birds) and non-consumptive 
(for example, backpacking, scuba diving, birdwatching) uses of pub-
lic natural resources. As noted, the Department essentially excludes 
option and existence values from consideration. 156 Private markets 
may provide measures of damages, either because private resources 
identical to the public resources are traded in private markets or 
because inferential market appraisals can be made. But, individually 
and collectively, resource values in situ may exceed the surrogate 
prices that might be observed for them in available private markets. 
For example, values for the fish, shell fish, plants, and coral in a live 
reef cannot be reflected adequately in the prices charged for them 
by laboratory suppliers or shell and curiosity shopowners.157 
Direct consumer behavior will not produce prices if resources are 
not directly traded in markets, which is often the case with resources 
for which damages under the Superfund may be recovered. Econo-
155 See supra note 1; see also E. YANG, R. DOWER & M. MENAFEE, THE USE OF ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS IN VALUING NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGES: AN OVERVIEW (Envtl. L. Inst. 1983); 
Yang, supra note 151, at 10,311; Frishberg, Computing Natural Resource Damages, Calif. 
L. Bus., June 6, 1988, at 1, col. l. 
156 Supra note 152. 
157 See Developments-Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1458, 1570-72 (1986), and 
the discussion there of the "absurd" measure in Puerto Rico v. The SS Zoe Colocotroni, 628 
F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981); see also Breen, CERCLA's Natural 
Resource Damages Provisions: What Do We Know So Far?, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. 
Inst.) 10,304, 10,309-10 (1984) (discussing recovery of restoration). 
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mists have developed methods to establish the money value of these 
resources. Aggregated travel expenses, entrance fees, the oppor-
tunity cost of travel time invested, and similar travel-related costs 
may reflect the value ("willingness to pay") of the natural resource 
visited. 158 Evaluation of travel costs, however, while the most widely 
used measure of demand for outdoor recreation, applies only if travel 
has a significant impact on access to the resource. Travel cost val-
uation also suffers from researchers' inability to gather accurate data 
and from conceptual problems in valuing travel time, isolating dam-
aged resources from undamaged ones, and establishing the condition 
of resources prior to injury ("the baseline"). 
Another indirect method, hedonic price valuation, does not fare 
better.159 This method tries to capture the value of a non-marketed 
resource as a measurable component of a marketed resource. For 
example, polluted air lowers housing prices and wages: price and 
wage differentials between clean and dirty air areas are taken as 
the value of the damages to the air. Yet, isolating lower public 
natural resource values as the cause in wage and price differentials 
is exceedingly difficult except in a very few instances. Further, 
resource availability will not affect wages and prices for many nat-
ural resource users. Indeed, many natural resources are highly val-
ued because they have few nearby neighbors, for example, marshes, 
natural parks, and forests. 
Another methodological line of attack, contingent valuation meth-
ods, depends upon asking interviewees directly what they would pay 
to maintain a resource in its present condition. 160 These methods 
depend upon a complete and accurate description of the resource and 
upon the interviewees' honesty and ability to imagine that money 
actually changes hands. Strategic responses by interviewees may 
skew these expressed preferences, however, as opposed to prefer-
ences revealed in actual market behavior. 
At the heart of these methodologies lies the concept that a use 
cannot be counted as lost and its money value counted as damages 
if another resource is available that provides the same services. 
Under the Department of Interior's approach, valuation techniques 
should fix the money value of the lost resources' uses or "services" 
158 See McConnell, Indirect Methods/or Assessing Natural Resource Damages Under CER-
CLA 35-39, paper prepared for the Resources for the Future Conference (Washington, D.C. 
June 16-17, 1988) (on file with author), and the numerous references cited therein. 
159Id. at 17-30. 
160 See generally R. CUMMINGS, D. BROOKSHIRE & W. SCHULZE, VALUING ENVIRONMEN-
TAL GOODS: A STATE OF THE ART ASSESSMENT (1986); Schulze, supra note 5. 
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that cannot be provided by the next best alternative. For example, 
damages at a destroyed lobster fishery would be measured by the 
added cost of access to a substitute fishery, differences in market 
value between the two fisheries' lobsters, and other indicia of the 
value of the government formerly owned or controlled but has since 
lost. 
Likewise, recovery for damage to a recreational beach would be 
limited to the money value of attributes unique to that beach, that 
is, its accessibility, swimming opportunities, suitability for sunba-
thing, and the like. In more precise economic terms, the Depart-
ment's approach seeks to recover lost economic rents from resources 
it controls. For both the fishery and beach, these rents are measured 
by the money value of the extra effort a lobster fisherman or beach 
visitor would have to make to receive the same price (lobster) or 
satisfaction (beach) at a substitute, "next best" fishery or beach. 
The problem with this economic framework is substitutability. 
Perfect substitution is conceptually contentious right at the outset. 
Many would argue that traditional notions of fungibility that might 
apply to cars, clothes, and houses, for example, simply do not apply 
to, say, marshes, rivers, and woodlands. Comparative degrees of 
less-than-perfect substitutability for marshes, bays, beaches, for-
ests, scenic overlooks, birding sites, aesthetic rock formations, and 
scenic rivers are no less daunting than perfect substitution. Defen-
dants will argue perfect or close substitutability while trustees will 
argue uniqueness, each marshalling their economic experts, but 
courts will probably be most impressed by the conceptual difficulty 
of comparing resources and of valuing lost resources with the tech-
niques and frameworks offered. Economists usually have underval-
ued "soft" aesthetic and recreational values in similar circumstances. 
This analysis brings the focus back to the Department's choice to 
force a selection of the lesser of diminution of use values and the cost 
of restoration or replacement, if the rebuttable presumption applies. 
If the trustee could focus on the costs of restoration or replacement 
from the outset, the result would more nearly conform to the overall 
congressional purpose in enacting Superfund: restoration of contam-
inated sites as near as possible to their prior condition. In any event, 
the statute requires that any and all damages recovered be spent on 
cleanup or replacement. Forced resort to lost use values as the 
measure of damages would simply reduce the amount available for 
cleanup or replacement in most cases. 
Restoration and replacement are much easier to estimate than 
diminution of use values. Instead of approximating lost uses, esti-
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mators compute the expense, for example, of dredging contaminated 
soil, containing and immobilizing wastes too extensive to relocate, 
and reintroducing plant and animal species. The problem that the 
estimators face resembles that facing the preparers of RIIFS at 
conventional Superfund sites, and the expertise garnered in this 
process may prove useful in estimating restoration of damaged nat-
ural resources. Admittedly, ecologists, botanists, biologists, and 
other scientists may disagree about the adequacy and feasible extent 
of restoration or replacement, despite recent progress in the new 
field of "restoration ecology. "161 But at least comparisons can be made 
"in kind" between the biological character of the resource before the 
injury, its scenic value, and the services it rendered, on the one 
hand, and the same attributes as provided by the restored resource 
or its replacement, on the other hand. 
By using estimations of restoration and replacement, reduction of 
lost values to suspect dollar sums becomes unnecessary. Lost use, 
option, and existence values are restored to the extent restoration 
or replacement is successful. It is true that to require restoration, 
that is, to restore the supply of a lost resource without limiting it 
somehow by considering demand, is to open the door to hugely 
expensive restoration projects. Benefit and cost must be kept in 
proportion, but surely techniques for doing so are well within the 
talents of economists, perhaps the same economists who developed 
the travel cost, hedonic, and contingent valuation methodologies. 
Unfortunately, the Department of Interior's interpretation fore-
closes a choice between restoration and lost use value that the De-
partment-the federal trustee primus inter pares-would presum-
ably want to preserve for itself, if the statute permits. And the 
statute does seem to permit a much broader reading. It authorizes 
recovery for injury, destruction, and loss, and it mentions replace-
ment value and lost use as relevant to determining damages. 162 
Moreover, it states that the measure of damages "shall not be limited 
by" restoration or replacement cost. 163 Consequently, the Depart-
161 See generally THE BREAKDOWN AND RESTORATION OF ECOSYSTEMS (Holdgate & Wood-
man eds. 1978); ECOLOGY AND RECLAMATION OF DEVASTATED LAND (Hutnik & Davis eds. 
1969); Aber & Jordan, Restoration Ecology: An Environmental Middle Ground, 35 BIOSCI-
ENCE 399 (1985). 
162 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(C), (0(1). 
163 Separate sections of CERCLA refer to measurement of damages. Section 9651(c)(2) calls 
for the regulations to "identify the best available procedures to determine such damages, 
including both direct and indirect injury, destruction, or loss and shall take into consideration 
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ment's interpretation not only falls to the "plain meaning" canon of 
statutory interpretation,164 it contradicts the legislative history of 
sections 4 and 6 of Senate Bill 1480, the Senate Superfund bil1. 165 
To support its reading, the Department relies on common law, 
citing the rule that, in general, the measure of damages is the lesser 
factors including, but not limited to, replacement value, use value, and ability of the ecosystem 
or resource to recover." Section 9607(0(1) provides that the "measure of damages in any 
action ... shall not be limited by the sums which can be used to restore or replace such 
resources. " 
164 Law professors sometimes cite the following tongue-in-cheek canon of statutory inter-
pretation to their students: if the legislative history is ambiguous, it is permissible to consult 
the statute. 
165 The legislative history provides guidance on the issue of the "lesser of" requirement. 
The following may seem tedious to students of broad public policy; however, it should interest 
a court reviewing the Department of Interior's regulations. 
The bill that was finally adopted was not the same bill described and discussed in the House 
and Senate committee reports. In the House, Superfund consisted of two bills, H. R. 7020 and 
H.R. 85. The former was the Hazardous Containment Act of 1980, adopted by the House on 
September 23, 1980. It was aimed at releases from hazardous waste disposal sites and did not 
contain natural resource damage provisions. H.R. 85 was the Comprehensive Oil Pollution 
Liability and Compensation Act and was adopted on September 19, 1980. It was originally 
aimed at oil pollution of navigable waters and adjacent areas. It was amended to include 
hazardous substances and allowed the President or the states to assert claims for natural 
resource damages as trustees for natural resources within their respective jurisdictions. Any 
compensation collected under the House approach could be used only for restoration of the 
resource or acquisition of equivalent resources. 
The Senate bill was the Environmental Emergency Response Act, S. 1480. It included 
broader natural resource damage provisions, allowing recovery by federal or state trustees 
and also by private persons for lost use, lost income, or impairment of earning capacity. The 
present language of CERCLA §§ 107(0(1), 301(c)(2) comes almost verbatim from the original 
S. 1480. (Present § 107(0(1) was § 4(b) of S. 1480 and present § 301(c)(2) was § 6(e)(1)(E) of 
S. 1480.). S. 1480, as passed, however, was an amendment in the nature of a substitute 
introduced by Senator Stafford on November 21, 1980, and debated on November 24, 1980. 
The amended S. 1480 combined elements from the two House bills and the original Senate 
bill. The natural resource damage provisions were scaled back to essentially their present 
form. The House adopted the amended Senate bill with some reluctance on December 3, 1980. 
The original legislative history of the Senate bill is quite pertinent, regardless of changes 
elsewhere in the Act. One preserved similarity between S. 1480 and CERCLA is that both 
provide two avenues for recovery: court action against liable parties, and claims against the 
Fund. In both S. 1480 and in CERCLA today, recovery from the Fund is more limited than 
the full scope of liability provided for in the law. 
Section 4 of S. 1480, the liability section, made responsible parties liable for "all damages 
for economic loss or loss due to personal injury or loss of natural resources ... including:" 
(A) injury, destruction or loss of real or personal property; 
(E) loss of use of real or personal property; 
(C) injury, destruction, or loss of natural resources, including cost of assessing such injury, 
destruction or loss; 
CD) loss of use of natural resources regardless of ownership or management; 
(E) loss of income or profits or impairment of earning capacity resulting from personal 
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of the value of lost uses or the cost of replacement or restoration. 166 
The Department infers that Congress intended to adopt this conser-
vative concept of damage measurement in the absence of "clearly 
expressed Congressional intent to deviate"167 from the common law. 
Yet the Department does not deny that liability is strict and joint 
and several, although Congress was no clearer in applying these 
doctrines to the remedial program. 168 
The Department has stated the common law rule in its most 
restrictive form.169 Some cases suggest, however, that the diminu-
tion in value measure of damages that governs damage to private 
property should not restrict recovery for injury to public natural 
resources. 170 In contrast, an Idaho federal district court has applied 
the restrictive version of the rule in a natural resource damage case 
injury, injury or destruction of real or personal property or natural resources regardless of 
property or resource ownership; 
(F) out-of-pocket medical expenses including rehabilitation costs; 
(G) taxes or other revenues lost by federal or state government for up to one year. 
S. 1480, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., § 4(a)(2) (1979). 
Section 4(b) made liability under § 4(a)(2)(C) run to the federal or state government which 
were authorized as trustees to recover the damages. Sums recovered were to be used to 
restore or replace the damaged resource, "but the measure of such damages shall not be 
limited by the sums which can be used to restore or replace such resources." [d. § 4(b). 
Section 6 of S. 1480 enumerated the permitted uses of the Fund. Of the liabilities listed 
under § 4(a)(2), recovery was permitted only for costs of damages under (C), (E), and (F). 
The report of the Committee on Environment and Public Works explains that, under (C), the 
Fund makes money available to the trustees to restore or replace the resource. But "in a case 
where the election to pursue an action under this legislation in court is chosen, the measure 
of such resource damages shall not be limited to the sums which can be used to restore or 
replace such resources." S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 85 (1980) (emphasis added). 
The remedy available through court action thus was intended to be broader than the admin-
istrative remedy available through a claim against the Fund. 
CERCLA preserved the dual remedy. Injured parties, including natural resource trustees, 
may recover from the responsible parties or from the Fund. Section 111 of CERCLA makes 
clear that the Fund is intended to reimburse actual expenditures, but recovery from respon-
sible parties is intended to include all losses, not just out-of-pocket costs. While the common 
law limits damages to the lower of restoration cost or loss of use, the language originating in 
S. 1480 and preserved in CERCLA created a broader remedy. 
166 Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 51 Fed. Reg. 27,704-05 (986); Natural Re-
source Damage Assessments, 53 Fed. Reg. 5168 (988). 
167 Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 51 Fed. Reg. 27,705 (1986). 
168 See supra notes 48, 108, 110 and accompanying text. 
169 Traditionally the courts have favored diminution in value, but the recent trend is toward 
awarding restoration costs. Although courts favor awarding the remedy which "costs" less, 
usually diminution in value, this is not an absolute rule. The courts in some cases involving 
crop damage have awarded the cost of reseeding and the rental value of the land during 
restoration. See D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 312-18, 325-27 (1973). 
170 See Halter & Thomas, supra note 34, at 5 (discussing Steuart Transp. Co. v. Allied 
Towing Corp., 596 F.2d 609 (4th Cir. 1979)). See especially Puerto Rico V. The SS Zoe 
Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652, 673-74 Ost Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912 (981). 
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that predated the Department's regulations and that was filed under 
state common law as well as the Superfund. 171 
The Department's approach seems misdirected. If the Depart-
ment's rules merely reiterate the common law, the provisions are 
supererogatory. Congress must have had an intent to create some-
thing new. In fact, one wonders if a state has a stronger case without 
the guidelines, under state parens patriae, public trust, and public 
nuisance doctrines. 172 Modern social legislation usually liberalizes 
traditional legal concepts that bar or impede ameliorative action and 
compensation. For example, traditional common law concepts were 
171 Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 635 F. Supp. 665 (D. Idaho 1986) (the state brought suit under 
CERCLA and the common law against the present and former owners of a mine for natural 
resource damages caused by mining wastes). The state contended that a value-based measure 
of recovery is appropriate under this concept, i. e., the value of the natural resources as they 
exist after the damage or injury has occurred would be subtracted from the value of the 
resources as they existed prior to the damage (considering all uses, aesthetic value, and 
economic value). Id. at 675. The defendants contended that the measure of recovery is the 
cost of assessing the damages and the cost of restoration or rehabilitation. I d. at 675-76. 
The Bunker Hill court cited remarks by Senator Simpson during a colloquy with Senator 
Stafford, chief sponsor of the final Superfund bill. Id. In the judge's paraphrase: 
[Senator Simpson] noted that methods of measuring resource damages are in the 
stage of early development. However, he suggested that traditional tort rules for 
calculating damages should be observed as appropriate. He commented by way of 
example that the law awards the difference in value before and after the injury in 
some cases and where the injury can be restored to its original condition for less 
than the difference in value, the cost of restoration is the appropriate measure. 
Id. at 676 (citing 126 CONGo REC. 30,986 (1980)). The court concluded that damages could be 
calculated both ways and that "the calculation which provides the least recovery in terms of 
dollars is the appropriate measure of damages." Id. No other sources for the holding are cited. 
Senator Stafford, the Senate's chief Superfund sponsor and floor manager, merely responded 
to Senator Simpson that damages for injury to natural resources could not be pursued until a 
restoration plan was developed and that rehabilitation and replacement of natural resources 
had to be accomplished in the most cost-effective manner possible. 126 CONGo REC. 30,986 
(1980). Thus he simply did not respond either to Senator Simpson's concern that the statutory 
definition natural resources covered "a very broad array of economic and aesthetic values," 
id., or to his support for traditional tort recovery. 
The wider colloquy between the two Senators shows something of the art of Senate legis-
lative history making. Senator Simpson was attempting to induce Senator Stafford to narrow 
the scope of Superfund or even to deny that Superfund created strict joint and several liability. 
Senator Simpson was a strong opponent of the bill and dissented from the Senate Report, on 
the ground that the bill required natural resources to be restored. Senator Stafford did state 
that the words "strict, joint and several" did not appear in the bill, and that beyond the CWA 
§ 311 liability standard, the bill did not embody "other forms of no fault liability or innovative 
Federal intrusion into the law now developing within individual State jurisdiction." I d. Senator 
Stafford had sidestepped the issues. Whatever else this meant, CERCLA has been interpreted 
to create strict, joint and several liability. Chancellor Bismark would have admired Senator 
Stafford's sausage-making ability. 
172 Atkeson & Dower, The Unrealized Potential of SARA: Mobilizing New Protection for 
Natural Resources, 29 ENV'T 6, 8 n.5 (1987); see also Carlson, supra note 31. 
450 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 16:405 
all extensively modified or superseded by Superfund. In particular, 
the natural resource damage provisions abandon the conservative 
common law approach mandating whatever damage recovery was 
least costly to the defendant. 
Further, the provision requiring the government to write regu-
lations that specify damage assessment methods was designed to 
assist trustees, not arrest their efforts at the threshold by codifying 
conservative common law doctrines that favor defendants. These 
doctrines have forced the courts to dismiss as speculative and insub-
stantial claims for damages for health, aesthetic, and environmental 
harms, claims which are widely acknowledged as important today. 173 
In response to such dismissals, Superfund gave the government the 
task of preparing natural resource damage recovery rules so that its 
expertise and technical specialization could be brought to bear on 
the complex task of measuring loss of aesthetic, conservational, 
recreational, and environmental values. The government's expertise 
is not needed if a court will merely apply familiar rules to rather 
obvious types of injury, such as, duck and geese kills through toxic 
spills on salt water. As a result, Congress apparently intended the 
regulations to function like criteria or presumption documents, which 
would ease the claimant's burden in personal injury cases. 174 In 
contrast, trustees have no need for regulations that merely declare 
the common law. 175 
More likely, Congress placed the rebuttable presumption in the 
statute anticipating that the government would be adopting regu-
lations that would press well beyond traditional damage awards. The 
rebuttable presumption facilitates recovery for difficult-to-quantify, 
difficult-to-characterize injuries that would not be compensated un-
der common law. Trustees claiming under liberal damage guidelines 
would need not only the prestige and assistance of government 
expertise but the potent procedural device of shifting the burden of 
persuasion to the defendant. Consequently, the Department's inter-
pretation denies trustees the assistance they need at the point they 
need it most. Moreover, the rebuttable presumption was intended 
173 For a recent example, see Sterling v. Velsicol Chern. Corp., 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. 
L. Inst.) 20,978, 20,985-90 (6th Cir. 1988). 
174 See supra note 89 and accompanying text (discussing how presumption would ease 
claimant's burden of proof). 
175 Some critics think that under the restrictive Department of Interior interpretation of 
the natural resources damage recovery provision, state public trust and nuisance law offers a 
promising parallel pathway to fuller natural resource damages recoveries, pending a change 
in the guidelines. See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 31. 
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to play the role it played in the original Superfund bill's personal 
injury provisions, black lung compensation proceedings, state work-
ers compensation claims, and other statutes. 176 
An attorney dare not tread into the tribal kingdom of the Econ, 
particularly to quarrel with the Micro caste. 177 But the temptation 
is great to comment on the perception that the rule that the De-
partment has adopted is generally sound from an economic view-
point, especially when this point of view is encountered in a law 
review. 178 The problem is not so much with the conceptual framework 
of trying to define and capture for the public its lost economic rents. 
Rather, the difficulty is that environmental damage computations 
and selection of damage assessment methodologies involve great 
uncertainty. Lost use value is a difficult concept to define even 
qualitatively, but an even greater problem comes in quantifying the 
lost values. Small resource damage recoveries seem inevitable where 
the lost resource values may actually be very large, because the 
trustee and court are forced under the guidelines both to ignore 
existence and option values and to accept tightly circumscribed lost 
use values instead of replacement or restoration costs, if they want 
to apply the rebuttable presumption . 
In its draft guidelines, the Department clearly acknowledged this 
problem and carved out an exception to its general policy limiting 
recovery to lost use value when restoration or replacement costs 
exceeded lost use value. This exception was limited, however, to 
"special resources," that is, resources set aside by statutes (for 
example, wildlife preserves, but not national forests or public lands) 
that reflect a political judgment that the value of such resources 
exceeds the resources' measurable use value.179 Despite its recog-
nition of a problem, the Department dropped the exception from the 
final guidelines, but offered to continue to consider it.180 Later, the 
Department flatly rejected the approach. 18l 
Arguably, Congress had these "special resources" particularly in 
mind when it enacted the natural resource damage provisions. Un-
176 See supra note 165 and accompanying text for a discussion of personal injury provision 
contained in the original Superfund bill. 
177 See generally Leijonhufvud, Life Among the Econ, 9 W. ECON. J. 327 (1973). 
178 Developments-Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note 157, at 1569 (stating that common law 
approach of valuing lesser of restoration cost and lost value is generally consistent with 
economic theory). 
179 50 Fed. Reg. 52,154 (1985). 
I"U Final Type B Rules, supra note 25, at 27,725. 
181 53 Fed. Reg. 22,454 (1987). 
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certainty pervades computation of "soft" lost uses on state and fed-
eral wetlands, forests, and public lands, for example, non-market 
values such as gene pools, bird watching, existence values, and 
option values. This uncertainty suggests two critical changes in the 
Department's approach necessary to conform the Department to the 
purposes of the law. First, the statute should be read to permit the 
restoration or replacement even where economists cannot yet accu-
rately compute the myriad of intangible but very real use values 
involved with natural resources. Second, the regulations should ac-
cept lost non-use values as compensable damages to natural re-
sources. 
In theory, the cost of replacement or restoration may be astro-
nomical. The Department itself once proposed an approach, however, 
that courts would find acceptable although economists would not, of 
not allowing restoration costs (greater than lost use costs) to be 
recovered even for special resources if the costs would be "grossly 
disproportionate to the benefits gained. "182 
B. An Approach to Judicial Interpretation 
In light of the foregoing, what can be said about how the courts 
will interpret and apply Superfund's natural resource damage pro-
visions? The statute lodges the ultimate authority to make damage 
awards in the federal district courts. State and federal trustees enjoy 
a special status as statutorily designated guardians of resources, and 
the Department of Interior determines which injuries are compens-
able and how much can be recovered. In the end, however, the 
courts must decide. In fact, their decisions ultimately will determine 
if the Superfund natural resource damage recovery provisions will 
be a potent remedy or an insignificant satellite of the spill and 
disposal site programs. 
The courts will have to make an initial decision whether to grant 
to the resource damage provision the broad interpretation that they 
have accorded to the removal and remedial programs. Modern re-
medial and compensatory legislation follows a congressional para-
digm that moves far beyond the common law. Despite courts' historic 
tendency to construe narrowly statutes derogating from the common 
law, the courts have accepted Congress's objectives and have even 
supplied missing elements and rationales where Congress acted has-
tily or indecisively. 
182 Developments-Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note 157, at 1570. 
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Superfund undoubtedly provides the best recent example. Courts 
have held that liability under Superfund is strict and joint and sev-
eral. It is hard to imagine that the courts would define liability for 
natural resources damage any more narrowly. Courts have relaxed 
causal requirements under the remedial program to an extent uni-
maginable at common law. Causation of resource damage is not likely 
to be more narrowly construed by the courts simply because natural 
resource injury is involved. To the contrary, one would expect the 
courts to recognize that establishing the cause of ecological and 
environmental injury is difficult to accomplish and that cause must 
be generously inferred if injuries are to be compensated for by their 
most likely agents. 
Under the remedial program, the federal government has wide 
latitude to specify the remedy to be effectuated virtually without 
cost constraint. Some site cleanup costs already have reached tens 
and hundreds of millions of dollars. Yet, despite judicial reaffirmation 
of EPA's plenary authority to obtain the cleanup it wants, even 
costly, near-perfect restoration, the agency has moved very slowly 
and has not in practice exerted its full legal authority. Resource 
damage awards large enough to permit the return of uses as close 
as possible to the environmental status quo before the injury seem 
very likely, subject to a rule of reason and a $50 million upper bound. 
EPA would not, however, order responsible parties to "clean up the 
Chesapeake Bay. "183 
In addition, courts are likely to agree that, by making the rebutt-
able presumption available, Congress wanted to ease the trustee-
plaintiff's difficult task of demonstrating environmental damage. The 
courts seem likely to grasp that, by conferring guideline-writing 
authority on the Department of Interior, Congress wanted the De-
partment to enhance a trustee's chances with the courts by endorsing 
complex methodologies for valuing injury to natural resources, meth-
odologies which otherwise might be viewed skeptically by a non-
scientific court of general jurisdiction. Hence, the rebuttable pre-
sumption provision and the guideline-writing provision go hand-in-
hand: together they help persuade a court to award full resource 
damages in situations where the court would otherwise be reluctant 
to act. 
The Department of Interior has not moved as vigorously in imple-
menting the natural resource damage provisions as the EPA has in 
lR3 Superfund establishes a $50 million liability limit per responsible party per release or 
incident, with certain exceptions. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c). 
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implementing the removal and remedial programs, nor has the De-
partment taken an expansive view of its guideline-writing authority. 
Arguing that both its power to specify methodologies and the effect 
of the rebuttable presumption may lead to unreasonably large re-
source damage recoveries, the Department has proceeded cau-
tiously. How will the courts react to the Department's approach? 
The answer must be given on two levels: judicial review of the 
Department's guidelines, and actual judicial determination of specific 
damage awards. 
A federal circuit court is now reviewing the guidelines to see if 
they comply with the law and whether they reasonably effectuate 
the resource damage provisions in light of the data that the Depart-
ment compiled, the public comments that it received, and the infer-
ences and l'easoning processes that it employed in selecting the final 
guidelines. Cases challenging both the type A and type B guidelines 
have been filed and are awaiting oral argument in the District of 
Columbia federal circuit court. 184 
To an administrative lawyer, such review is standard fare for 
federal rulemaking. Judicial review of administrative discretionary 
decisionmaking is commonplace in modern federal environmental 
policy making. Judicial challenges to an agency's overall plans for 
implementing a statute frequently bring key role players back to 
rehash basic policies, this time with a judge rather than an agency 
rule maker in charge. Often, private insider groups (major compa-
nies, Washington trade associations, and the leading environmental 
organizations) are pleased to have an opportunity through an "om-
nibus" lawsuit to sit down alone with the agency and each other to 
negotiate quietly and informally, subject to court approval by con-
sent decree of the numerous parties' proposed settlement. 185 The 
natural resource regulations seem on track for trial and judicial 
decision, however, because the parties seem committed to their 
differing interpretations of the statute. 
The interpretation of a federal statute by the agency charged with 
its implementation ordinarily is entitled to deference by the review-
ing court. 186 Application of this principle would seem to ensure that 
184 National Wildlife Fed'n v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, No. 87-1266 (filed in D.C. Cir.). 
1"5 See Anderson, Negotiation, supra note 52, at 344-47; see generally Gaba, Informal 
Rulemakiug by Settlement Agreement, 73 GEO. L.J. 1241 (1985); Shane, Federal Policy 
Making by Consent Decree: An Analysis of Agency and Judicial Discretion, 1987 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 241. 
186 Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843-44, reh'g 
denied, 468 U.S. 1227 (1984); Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). 
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the current guidelines would survive judicial review. But EPA is 
indisputably the lead agency charged with implementing Superfund, 
not the Department of Interior. Officials from EPA appear before 
Congress in oversight hearings and monitor environmental condi-
tions. They proposed many of the changes in CERCLA that Con-
gress accepted in 1986. As a result, if a court defers to an agency 
interpretation, it will defer to EPA's view, not the Department's. 
Deference to the Department's interpretation is also less appro-
priate because interpretation of statutory language, especially where 
common law doctrines and terminology may be involved, is partic-
ularly the province of judges. 187 Judges ordinarily view themselves 
as more expert than the expert agency in discerning congressional 
intent where the meaning of traditional legal doctrines is involved. 
For example, on the question of whether Congress intended to limit 
resource damages to the lesser of diminution of use value and res-
toration or replacement costs-the traditional common law ap-
proach-there is no reason at all for the reviewing court to give 
special deference to the Department of Interior's interpretation. 
Likewise, a court is quite capable of deciding for itself whether 
the Department's guidelines must stay closer to traditional notions 
of legal causation than does the EPA approach (already approved by 
the courts) which adopts a greatly relaxed causal nexus requirement. 
And a court should have no problem determining whether Congress 
intended only to mandate the common law market value damage 
assessment approach or whether Congress intended for the full array 
of non-market values (bird watching, hiking, etc.), existence values, 
and option values to be included. Certainly a court would ask 
whether limiting recoveries primarily to market values would have 
required Congress to bother with providing for the preparation of 
special guidelines or enacting the rebuttable presumption. 
The Department of Interior's guidelines will eventually be avail-
able for application by trustees and district courts in determining 
actual resource damages in individual cases. What will happen at 
this second level of judicial implementation of the resource damage 
provisions? Some courts undoubtedly will apply the departmental 
guidelines and the rebuttable presumption and, assuming the pres-
ent guidelines remain unchanged, will allow only what these rules 
permit, in particular the lesser of diminished use values and resto-
ration or replacement costs. Yet, if other courts are persuaded that 
Congress did intend more liberal damages, they have the option of 
187 NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111, 130-31, reh'g denied, 322 U.S. 769 (1944). 
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accepting the trustees' evidence on non-market uses, existence val-
ues, and option values. If the courts accept the trustees" arguments, 
they may award these types of damages under Superfund. 
The difficulty with this approach is that the trustees must succeed 
without the benefit of the rebuttable presumption. Still, some federal 
district court judges may resent being tutored by a federal agency 
on what evidence to accept or reject in a plenary action for damages. 
Some courts conceivably could accept the broad interpretation given 
to strict liability, joint and several liability, causation, defenses, and 
restoration costs by other federal courts under Superfund, but reject 
the narrower approach to acceptable evidence of resource damages 
embodied in the Department of Interior's guidelines. Such courts 
would proceed to assess independently the trustees' claims in light 
of Superfund's overall remedial and compensatory policy. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
This Article suggests that the courts will be sympathetic to the 
natural resource damage provisions of Superfund. A circuit court 
must soon review the Department of Interior's cautiously written 
guidelines to see if they fulfill the intent of the statute. There are 
cogent reasons why the court may find that the Department's ap-
proach falls short of statutory intent. If the guidelines do survive 
judicial review, the question for the future of the natural resource 
damage provisions in the federal district courts may come down to 
whether the district courts accept the Department of Interior's guid-
ance on permissible damage recovery, or whether they take an in-
dependent tack and fashion their own approach. Too restrictive an 
approach by the Department of Interior, endorsed by this circuit 
court of appeals, may lead to "runaway" federal district courts. As 
a result, courts may conclude that Congress intended larger resource 
damage awards in particular cases than the Department of Interior's 
guidelines permit. 
The rebuttable presumption is available at the election of the 
trustee. State trustees are free to ignore it and put before the courts 
methodologies and lost values that the Department has elected to 
pass over. And a departmental trustee may not be fulfilling his or 
her fiduciary duty toward resources if he or she fails to go beyond 
the employer's guidelines when it appears that a larger recovery can 
be won. Justice Department lawyers may soon be faced with the 
dilemma whether their obligation as counsel is to plead in the alter-
native: guidelines and presumption but a lesser claim; no benefit of 
guidelines and the presumption but a greater claim. 
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Federal district courts are used to vigorous prosecution of site 
cleanup cases by EPA and the Justice Department. They may re-
solve conflicts over resource claims by following the lead already 
established by courts in the remedial program, by listening carefully 
to the more enthusiastic state trustees, and by permitting private 
intervenors to enter cases where the federal trustee seems con-
strained by overly cautious federal policies. All of these possibilities 
exist because the thrust of the new federal paradigm for remedial 
and compensatory legislation authorizes and perhaps even compels 
the courts to go beyond the strictures of the common law in cor-
recting the unprecedented environmental problems that modern so-
ciety faces. 
Admittedly, if courts strike out on their own, they may have to 
hear, not only from biologists and engineers about restoration or 
replacement of a damaged resource, but also from welfare econo-
mists, who will testify that certain difficult-to-quantify lost use val-
ues, existence values, and option values should be compensated for, 
despite the Department's approach. Such trials will involve more 
work for already overburdened federal district court judges. Some 
judges may prefer to let the Department do the thinking for them, 
partly to save time, partly to shorten technical presentations, and 
partly to honor the intent of Congress that the Department play a 
role. But federal judges are the type of individuals who would enjoy 
the challenging philosophical and policy issues bound up in valuing 
vistas, songbirds, endangered species habitat, and ecosystem sta-
bility. Many would be quite interested to hear what economists have 
to say in their courtrooms. 
